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ABSTRACT
A NIETZSCHEAN CRITIQUE OF KANT'S HIGHEST GOOD
SEPTEMBER I988
DONALD M. SCHNEIER, B.A.
,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
M.A.
,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Robert Paul Wolff
The concept of the highest good is important to Kant be-
cause it serves to connect his rationalist ethics to reli-
gion. However, this concept entails a paradoxical treatment
of the concept of happiness which some commentators believe
strains Kant’s rationalism. After discussing and assessing
previous approaches to this problem in Kant's ethics, I de-
velop a different line of argument against it. I draw upon
Nietzsche's theory of valuation to demonstrate how Kant's
treatment of reward and punishment, and, hence, of happiness,
diverges from his rational principles. Such a line seems to
prove more decisive than previous efforts, as I furthermore
argue. This Nietzschean approach also suggests a novel per-
spective on the relation between Kant and Nietzsche.
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INTRODUCTION
This project grew out of what was initially an histor-
ical inquiry. I was then interested in the relation between
some trends in contemporary philosophy and seventeenth-
and eighteenth-century philosophy. This led me into doing
some work on the way in which the contemporary philosophers
Husserl, Ortega, and Heidegger have appropriated the doc-
trines of Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant, respectively.
Soon I developed a more concentrated interest in Kant,
but my curiosity about his relation to more recent philo-
sophy remained. As I became more familiar with Jaspers,
it was Kant's relation to existential thinking in partic-
ular which drew my attention. It seemed to me that the
existentialist notion of freedom bears a close resemblance
to the Kantian concept of autonomy. However, such a com-
parison would seem to fly in the face of certain received
opinions about the relation between Kant and the existen-
tialists, For, existentialist individualism seems direct-
ly antagonistic to Kantian universalism and impersonalism.
Furthermore, Kant is often regarded as being the direct
forerunner of Hegelianism, a doctrine which most existen-
tialists seem to plainly, and even vehemently, oppose.
These conflicting historical theses came into sharper
relief as I began to study Nietzsche, who is regarded, on
the one hand as one of the seminal figures in existential-
ism, and on the other, as an opponent of anti-individual-
istic thinking which seems to be essential to Kantianism
2and Hegelianism. But, again, the views in question seemed
to fall only uneasily into those historical categories.
Nietzsche's advocacy of not only autonomy hut of also crit-
ical methodology places him much more squarely in a Kant-
ian tradition than such categorization would seem to have
it.
It was beginning to occiir to me that one of the key tenets
of the received historical thesis is the assumption that
Hegel is the sole legitimate nineteenth-century heir of
Kant. At about the same time, as I was becoming acquaint-
ed with Schopenhauer, the questionability of that tenet be-
came obvious. For, Schopenhauer's philosophy is as much
a development out of Kant's as is Hegel's, only one which
is less popular and prominent. And furthermore, Nietzsche's
thinking is quite clearly a direct development out of Scho-
penhauer's. Hence, it was now possible to examine Kant's
relation to existentialism in the context of a tradition
which is able to bypass Hegel.
After this, I began to concentrate on Nietzsche from
among the existentialists, with an eye towards determining
how Nietzsche maintains his advocacy of autonomy and cri-
tique while apparently jettisoning Kant's committment to
rationalism. Then my investigations took a surprising twist.
Partly inspired by Deleuze, I began to see that Nietzsche
had not in fact jettisoned rationalism, but, quite to the
contrary, that it is one of his main contentions that it is
Kant who tiirns misologist.
3This surprising conception of the relation between Kant
and Nietzsche seemed fruitful enough to be the makings of
a project of the present scope. In fact, it became apparent
that it would exceed present constraints. It became clear
that such a project would require defending not only this
novel conception of their relation, but also revised inter-
pretations of each thinker individually.
How to narrow down my ambitions became clear as I began
to concentrate on the ethical facet of Kant’s philosophy.
The concept, in the latter, of the highest good was emer-
ging as one which, on the one hand, is clearly objection-
able to Nietzsche, and, on the other, seemed to strain some
fundamental Kantian rational principles, ^//hen I understood
how Nietzsche’s objections are in the name of reason, even if
present constraints precluded the possibility of defending
it as a definitive imderstanding, I v/as nevertheless suf-
ficiently prepared to proceed to. a. discussion of Kant’s
ethics which appears in these pages.
Thus, the focus of my discussion is on Kant's concept of
the highest good. The first chapter below explains the con-
cept and assesses its significance. The concept is impor-
tant to Kant because it serves to connect his rational ethics
to religion. However, the concept hinges upon a paradox-
ical treatment of the concept of happiness, and, so, pre-
sents a ripe target for criticism. This chapter will show
that this weakness seems to force Kant to the undesirable
resort of assistance from utilitarianism.
4The second chapter responds to the utilitarian defense of
Kant’s highest good, by examining a further criticism of the
latter. Here I have recourse to some of the results of the
historical phase of the genesis of this project, as this
second approach is Schopenhauer's critique of Kant's high-
est good. As will be seen, though, neither the Schopen-
hauerian attack nor the utilitarian defense are decisive
either individually or with respect to one another, so the
status of that highest good remains at this point in ques-
tion.
The last two chapters attempt to resolve the issue by
developing the Nietzschean approach to the question. This
approach v/ill take advantage of the uncertainty of Kant's
treatment of happiness by demonstrating discrepancies be-
tween rational principles and Kant's treatment of reward
and punishment. With this critique of Kant's highest good
established, the need at the end of the foiirth chapter to
explain my appropriation of Nietzsche for the critique a
little further, affords me an opportunity to close with v;hat
could serve as a preliminary discussion of the historical
thesis v;hich I could not get to in these pages.
CHAPTER 1
HAPPINESS AND UTILITARIANISM IN KANT'S ETHICS
Introduction
In this first chapter, I will present a preliminary dis-
cussion of Kant's highest good, and of the difficulties which
it poses to him. The focus here, and in subsequent chapters,
will be on the questionable status of the inclusion of per-
sonal happiness in the highest good. Such an inclusion im-
plies that personal happiness is in some sense good accord-
ing to pure practical reason. But this would seem to contra-
dict a variety of passages in which Kant appaurently attri-
butes to pure practical a much lower estimation of happiness.
From the perspective of those passages, therefore, what Kant
is calling the 'highest good* is not that of pure practical
reason at all, and to label it the highest good of 'pure
practical reason' is a mistake. Furthermore, such an error
raises the suspicion that Kant is diverging from, or even be-
traying, the fundamental principles of rational ethics, by
arriving at that position in his highest good.
A contemporary commentator, Lewis White Beck, has formu-
lated a typical criticism of Kant along these lines, and his
argument will be outlined below. The strength of his posi-
tion will be shown by its ability to withstand a defense of
Kant by another contemporsiry
,
Allen Wood, whose response to
Wood will also be discussed. However, the limits of Beck's
6criiiicisni wilX bscoins ©vid.sn'fc whsn it coinss up sgsinst ano-
ther* defense of Kant, one ha.sed on Miil's utilitarianism.
The maxn point in the utilitarian defense is that pure
practical reason is actually a means to universal happiness,
and that Kant’s highest good is nothing but an idiosyncratic
representation of universal happiness. If so, then his high-
est good is that of pure practical reason. However, it is
unclear that Kant would welcome such assistance. On the
utilitarian account, important Kantian concepts like autonomy
and the end-in-itself are subordinated to universal happi-
ness. Furthermore, for Kant to embrace it would involve his
making methodological, if not national, concessions. His
rooting of the concepts of totality and universality in pure
reason strongly contests the claims of a thinker like Hume as
to the exclusively empirical lineage of a key ethical concept
like universal sympathy. So to grant to another British em-
piricist like Mill that an empirical concept like happiness
latently predominates at the heart of Kantian ethics, would
seem to signal a major weakening of the rationalist tradition
and a major concession on Kant's part. Hence, his highest
good stands as a very vulnerable side of his ethics.
The concept of happiness in Kant’s ethics
For Kant, happiness is the Idea of "the satisfaction of
all inclinations as a sum."^ Thus, it is for him a possible
state of affairs, in contrast with, notably, Aristotle, for
whom happiness is an activity. The formal nature of this
7totality is a "bit imclear, since inclinations can be syste-
matically arranged in more than one way. In one respect, the
satisfaction of each individual inclination would constitute
happiness, while in another, individual inclinations could be
hierarchically organized, in which case satisfaction of the
highest inclination would suffice to secure happiness.
Whether or not this unclarity is significant is also unclear,
but since he does connect pleasure and pain with the satis-
faction and dissatisfaction of inclinations, the satisfaction
of each of a variety of desires would seem to be more plea-
surable than happiness that involves some sacrifice.
He maintains that "to be happy is necessarily the desire
of every rational but finite being, ... a being of needs.
Sometimes he refers to the motive of one's own happiness as
'self-love'. A rational being is one who acts on principles,
and rules for action based on the principle of self-love are
maxims. Such maxims will always aim at the satisfaction of
at least one need, and so are always motivated by pleasure.
Since the satisfaction of a need involves the securing of the
means to satisfaction, a maxim formulates a purposive connec-
tion between the satisfaction of a need and the means to it.
Usually a maxim is imperatively expressed, and maxims based
on self-love are classified by Kant as hypothetical, in one
scheme, and as prudential or pragmatic, in another.
8Against happiness as a universal moral principle
Though Kant recognizes that every finite rational being
necessarily pursues his happiness, he denies that the pursuit
of happiness is qualified to stand as a universal moral prin-
ciple. In fact, quite frequently he seems to treat it as the
very problem that a morality is designed to solve, as when
with reference to the inclinations he urges, "it must rather
be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly
free from them."-^ However, elsewhere his arguments against
self-love as a moral principle seem free of such antipathy
to the inclinations.
In one place he suggests that the pursuit of happiness is
an unfit universal moral principle simply because it is no
moral principle. As he puts it, "Since every man (by virtue
of his natural impulses) has his own happiness as his end, it
4
would be contradictory to consider this an obligatory end."
For Kant, a moral principle specifies duties and imposes ob-
ligations, but what is done naturally excludes prescribed al-
ternative pursuits. The law of the pxirsuit of happiness is
in fact a descriptive principle, and so is a concern of theo-
retical and not of practical reason, and hence not of moral
philosophy, according to his remarks here. Again, however,
it is unclear that this strong argument represents his defin-
itive position, since what appear to be his favorite lines of
argument are directed against a different point.
What he seems most concerned to refute is that the prin-
ciple of self-love could attain to any sort of universality.
9Now it might seem easy to proclaim that each person ought to
pursue his or her own happiness, and conclude that this is a
universal moral principle. But Kant denies this, on the
grounds that "in the desire for happiness it is not the form
(accordance with law) but only the material which is deci-
sive."^ Even though each person necessarily pursues happi-
ness, the means to satisfaction will vary from case to case,
depending on the differing needs of different people. In
this respect, self-love is not so much a vmiversal principle
as it is a trivial one, masking what is in fact a radically
heterogeneous collection of individual principles.
Furthermore, he argues that universality and self-love are
incompatible, if not logically then at least practically. If
self-love were raised to the status of universality as a mo-
ral principle, then because of the heterogeneity of pursuits,
"there would be the extreme opposite of harmony, the most ar-
rant conflict, and the complete annihilation”^ of this imi-
versal law itself. For, if the pursuit of happiness inevi--
tably leads to universal conflict, then it leads to its very
opposite, namely unhappiness. Thus, self-love could never
survive as a universal moral principle.
A slightly weaker argument appears with reference to a
proponent of the self-love principle, who Kant classifies va-
riously as a eudaimonist or an Epicurean. These latter agree
with Kant that virtue is not an empty moral category, but
urge that the prospect of happiness can motivate virtue. In
response, Kant argues to the effect that virtue quite
10
frequently requires unselfishness, in which case they have
no claim on a concept of virtue. But if it is the capacity
of any moral principle to define a concept of virtue, then
the principle of self-love is not moral. Insofar as a eudai-
monist embraces the piirsuit of happiness as a universal mo-
ral principle, Kant would seem to be quite strongly opposed
to eudaimonism.
The moral status of happiness
From these foregoing arguments it would seem as if the hu-
man need for happiness were in Kant's opinion either of no
moral significance whatsoever, something requiring morality
to regulate it, or something which morality is required to
overcome and suppress. As it turns out, though, none of
these is his expressed view. In contrast with the first, he
says it does possess moral significance, but in contrast with
the third, this significance is positive. However, it is not
as positive as the second suggests. Rather, for Kant, happi-
ness is a conditioned component of the highest good.
Kant defines a good as "a necessary object of the facul-
7
ty of desire, . . • according to a principle of reason."
0
Alternatively, it is "an effect possible through freedom."
His * Fundamental Law of Pure Practical Reason' , also known
as ' the moral law* , is the expression of freedom that is the
formal condition of all maxims of action: "So act that the
maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a
principle establishing universal law."^ Hence, any result of
11
willing in obedience to this law is good, and only any such
result is good. Thus, for example, an action whose maxim ac-
cords with the conditions of the moral law is good, and only
such an action.
The supreme good is the "imconditional condition ... of
whatever appears to us to be desirable. Thus, it is the
effect of rational action which is the basis of all other
such effects. Now, the immediate condition of a good action
is the willing that produces it. But such willing is deter-
mined by the moral law which it obeys, so the immediate con-
dition of a good action is a good will. In turn, the con-
dition of the merely temporary possession of a good will is
its permanent possession. A permanently good will is an ab-
solutely good will whose maxims xinfailingly accord with the
moral law. Because of its unceasing goodness, Kant terms
such a will 'holy’. However, "the utmost that finite prac-
tical reason can accomplish is to make sure of the imending
progress of its maxims toward this model and of the constan-
cy of the finite rational being in making continuous pro-
gress. This is virtue, ... a naturally acquired facul-
ty. Thus, virtue is the supreme good for finite rational
creatures like humans
.
But though virtue is the supreme good, it is not the high-
est good, not that whole good "which is no part of a yet lar-
ger whole. Virtue is no such whole because it is the wor-
thiness to be happy, but for a virtuous person to "be in need
of happiness and also worthy of it and yet not to partake of
12
it could not be in accordance with the complete volition of
13
an omnipotent rational being" ^ possesses an impartial rea-
son. Thus, happiness is required to complete the highest
good, but only as a subordinate constituent. In other words,
happiness is an absolute good, but only if the creature who
desires it already possesses virtue.
It becomes clear, though, that the nature of the relation
between virtue and happiness in the highest good is not mere-
ly one of complementarity. Rather, Kant specifies that there-
14in happiness stands "in exact proportion to morality."
This suggests that varying degrees of approximation to full
happiness also possess conditional goodness. Thus, it is mo-
rally preferable to be less happy than someone equally moral
but xmdeservedly happier. This variability allows Kant to
speak generally of deservedness and undeservedness in rela-
tion to happiness, and at least once he calls a world wherein
happiness is distributed in accordance with a law of this
kind of proportionality "the best world.
Controversy over this status
As mentioned above, in according happiness this status of
a conditional component of the highest good, Kant is trying
to distinguish his position from three others which closely
resemble it, and which he seems to maintain when arguing a-
gainst eudaimonism. His points of distinction are, first,
that happiness is not entirely devoid of moral significance,
since it is part of the highest good. Second, happiness is
13
not the supreme good, since virtue is. Finally, the desire
for happiness is not an evil, since goodness is not whole
when the virtuous remain unhappy.
However, it is not clear that he has conclusively distin-
guished himself from any of those three. Their proponents
could argue that, in the first case, the happiness that Kant
includes in the highest good is not happiness in its actual
form. In the actual world virtue is not rewarded hy happi-
ness, so whatever happiness does exist has no moral signifi-
cance. Second, the predominant feature of Kant's highest
good is not virtue, hut the rule for the distribution of hap-
piness. Hence, happiness is the supreme good, and virtue is
a mere feature of the distribution process. Finally, the
happiness that would complete the highest good is not natur-
ally desired happiness, for naturally desired happiness re-
quires correction by the moral law. Since it requires cor-
rection, it must be morally incorrect, i.e. evil.
These challenges are from three disparate points of view,
but one thing that they are intimating in common is that
Kant's attempt to accord to happiness the moral status that
he does is contrived. Kant is especially open to such an ac-
cusation because of the consequences he tries to draw from
his concept of the highest good. In his Critique of Pure
Reason he rather decisively drains the concepts of rational
theology of all meaning. Now, however, his concept of the
highest good allows him to resurrect them. Virtue is a ra-
tional concept, but the attainment of virtue requires an
14
infinite progress. Thus, practical reason must, if it is to
conceive of virtue, presuppose the possibility of the immor-
tality of the soul. Furthermore, the existence of a world
where the mere intentions of agents are causally related to
their external happiness, is possible only if a God exists
with the power of such causality. Hence, the highest good,
also presupposes the existence of God, and the concept of God
acquires new meaning. But then, given his destructiveness
elsewhere, it is not surprising that the means by which Kant
has resuscitated these concepts, namely through his concept
of the highest good, should invite especially close scrutiny.
Hence, the challenge that the highest good is an ad hoc man-
ouevre by Kant, is a provocative one. For this reason, set-
tling the status of happiness in his moral theory is an im-
portant issue.
Thus, for example, since «the actual world presents plenty
of counterexairaples to deserved happiness, God obviously does
not exist, it could be argued. For, if he did, he would al-
ready be rev/arding virtue and punishing vice. Hence, Kant s
best world is merely a device for wishing God into existence.
Or, it could also be argued, if the highest good is at bottom
a formula for the harmonious distribution of individual hap-
pinesses, then to attribute goodness to an alleged entity
like a will, rather than to performed actions, is an unneces-
sary complication the only purpose of which is to ground the
introduction of a judge with privileged access to that non-
empirical entity. Finally, if Kant truly finds the drive
15
for happiness morally repugnant, insofar as it is what moral-
ity is meant to correct or cure, then to invoke God as a re-
warder of individual .happiness rings false. Facing charges
like these, Kant needs to have his position straightened out.
Beck's and Wood’s positions
The difficulty Kant faces with respect to the status of
happiness can be brought into sharper focus through an "exa-
mination of a recent exchange involving a position similar to
the first of the three discussed above. In his A Commentary
on Kant's "Critique of Practical Reason" Lewis White Beck
argues that the concept of the highest good fails to confer
moral significance on happiness, despite Kant's professions
to the contrary. In Kant's Moral Religion , Allen Wood de-
fends Kant against Beck.
Beck's main point is that Kant is mistaken in claiming
that his highest good is an "object of the pure practical
1 ^
reason," for that highest good is "not a practical concept
at all."^’^ Now, one component of it, virtue, is a practical
concept, according to Beck. This is because virtue is rea-
lizable through action that is performed in accordance with
the moral lav/. In contrast, as Kant admits, bringing it a-
bout that virtue is rewarded with happiness, is well beyond
the power of a finite being. Hence, it is not an effect pos-
sible through human freedom, and, hence, it is no practical
concept.
16
To be sure, Kant, in other contexts, claims that the pro-
motion of the happiness of others is a moral obligation.
However, these 'others' are specifically other rational be-
ings, for he maintains that hi;imans have no such obligation to
non-rational beings. What confers apparent moral dignity on
the happiness of other hxamans is the moral dignity which they
possess as free. But Kant has failed to demonstrate that
there is a practical connection between freedom and happi-
ness. Thus, it cannot be argued on the basis of his highest
good that happiness gains moral significance through being
involved in the specification of moral duties. Thus, these
duties cannot be invoked to justify the connection of happi-
ness to practical laws which his highest good seems to pre-
sent.
If Beck is right, then the concept of the highest good re-
presents a deviation from Kant's own principles. That is,
given the fundamental law of pure practical reason, it simply
does not follow that practical reason requires that virtue be
connected to happiness in any kind of way other than as a
constraint on self-love. Hence, when Wood argues that Beck s
criticism "expresses an attitude towards rational morality
18
and action which is fundamentally different from Kant's,"
he is begging the question. For Beck's point is that it is
the claim that Kant's highest good is a practical concept
which is the expression of a non-Kantian attitude. Wood vir-
tually concedes this by labelling it a "philosophical con-
ception,"^^ sidestepping whether it is a practical concept.
17
As Wood clarifies his response to Beck, the issue is not
so much a question of attitude, hut rather that Beck is mis-
interpreting Kant's project in this area. Now, Wood acknow-
ledges that some kind of error is involved in the concept of
the highest good, hut, as he reminds the reader, the Critique
of Pure Reason demonstrates the philosophical significance of
certain kinds of errors. Similarly, Kant means to demon-
strate that the error involved in his highest good is "im-
avoidahle; it is not a mere blunder, hut a 'sophistry of pure
reason itself,' hy means of which hijman reason is forced to
recognize and to respond to its finite and problematic condi-
tion."^^ This response concerns postulating the existence of
God and the cultivation of faith.
Religion thus becomes the recourse to which human power-
lessness in the face of the full consequences of what reason
requires, namely the realization of the highest good, leads.
Thus, reason's apportioning of happiness on the basis of vir-
tue is a confusion, but a morally significant one, since it
forces one to recognize one's finitude. If reason does not
attempt to connect virtue to happiness, one might never come
to recognize one's frailty, no matter how diligently one pur-
sues virtue. Kant's project is thus to systematically locate
morality in relation to religion, which Beck fails to appre-
ciate, according to Wood.
Again, though, the question that Beck is raising concerns
whether or not Kant has betrayed certain salient features
of
order to contrive a link to religion.his moral philosophy in
And again. Wood here seems to avoid addressing the central
point of Beck’s criticism. Beck does not deny that the high-
est good is a concept of pixre reason; what he does deny is
that Kant's is a concept of piire practical reason, something
which Wood in this context himself does not come quite around
to affirming. The moral law simply does not entail the kind
of connection between virtue and happiness that Kant's con-
cept presumes upon. Hence, his highest good is not a concept
that Kant, or anyone, can derive from pure practical reason
alone. Kant is wrong to claim that it is.
Despite appearances to the contrary, potential support for
Beck comes from Gilles Deleuze's Kant's Critical Philosophy .
Deleuze concurs that Kant's highest good is in some respect
erroneous, but that the error stems from a "deeper principle
in pure practical reason." If he is right, then the high-
est good could, as Kant argue“s, in fact be a practical con-
cept. He maintains that Kant himself discusses the error
when analyzing a "subreption," in a context which Beck no-
tably dismisses^^ as inessential to Kant's explanation of his
highest good. Kant here discusses the feeling of inner sa-
tisfaction that accompanies the consciousness of the mastery
over the inclinations which the performance of a good action
always involves. This non-consequentialist variety of plea-
sure seems to come very close to Aristotle's concept of hap-
piness as an activity, and Kant seems to be warning here that
its autonomous nature is easily obscured in consciousness.
As a result, what is in fact an integration of action and
19
accompanying satisfaction, gets misconstrued as an action
followed by pleasure as its consequences, due to the serial
form of inner sense. Deleuze argues that here lies the pos-
sibility of a one-to-one correspondance between virtue and
happiness, writ small.
’//hether or not Deleuze's eccentric but ingenious interpre-
tation of the highest good represents Kant's own intentions,
not only does he offer no support to Wood, but his analysis
tends to confirm Beck's position. As he quite clearly spells
out, the ground of the subreption is the form of inner sense,
v;hich cannot but help representing the acting and the satis-
faction as successive and therefore distinct. But then the
synthetic connection is merely one of natiaral causality. If
the concept of the highest good is this, writ large, then it
is a theoretical, not a practical, concept, which is precise-
ly Beck's point. It may be,^ though, that Deleuze's point is
that practical reason allows itself to be moved by this theo-
retical conception, in which case it is suffering from a ver-
sion of what is usually called weakness of the will. But
weakness of the will is precisely what the moral law means to
combat, so the link to pure practical reason remains
undemon-
strated.
Probably the most promising line of argiiment for Wood can
be developed from the correct observation that "happiness is
part of the matter of every maxim of a finite rational be-
though Wood himself does not take it far enough. As
has been discussed, happiness is naturally the end of
every
20
rnaxini
,
and "ths moral law cons'trains "the pursui't of happiness
of others. Thus, the effect of pure practical reason is not
merely the constraint alone, hut rather the degree of happi-
ness achieved in combination with the constraint. So, a mod-
ified version of happiness is indeed included among the ef-
fects of pure practical reason, and, thus, happiness is part
of the object of piire practical reason.
It is not clear, though, what this has to do with the con-
cept of the highest good, in which happiness does not refer
to the effects of certain actions. If it did, then the se-
cond component of the highest good would refer to the total-
ity of happiness brought about in the world through virtuous
action, a totality which could exclude one's own, not to a
reward for performing virtuously. However, it does seem
open
to Wood to explain a reward as a conception of the
effect
which would occur if every other rational agent were also
virtuous. If so, then others would promote one's own
happi-
ness, and one's own happiness would indeed be an
effect of
pure practical reason, proportioned to virtue in
this opti-
mal case.
It is unclear that Wood would embrace this
extension of
his position, but it is hard to see how else he
could mount a
satisfactory response to Beck. It is also unclear
how moved
Beck would be by such a rejoinder. He only very briefly
con-
siders such a solution, under the rubric of 'a
self-rewarding
morality' , and gives no indication whether or
not he would
agree that it indeed represents the highest good
as a concept
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of pure practical reason. However, even if both, not to men-
tion Kant himself, were to settle on this conception of the
}^j_ghest good, it is by no means certain that the matter is
closed, for new difficulties face this conception.
Happiness as the matter of maxims
The central point of Wood's defense of Kant is that happi-
ness is morally significant, and indeed is a good, because
happiness is part of the matter of maxims, where the one mo-
ral law is their formal principle. Put alternatively, happi-
ness, albeit of a modified sort, is an effect of freedom, be-
cause it is among the effects produced by action the end of
which combines some degree of one's own happiness, the de-
gree of happiness that is sacrificed by the formal con-
straint, and whatever other duties are specified. But, as
has been mentioned, this raises two difficulties for Wood.
«»
First, there are undoubtedly times when a moral action will
require complete self-abnegation, in which case one s own
happiness is not an effect of moral action. Second, Kant
makes it clear in a variety of places that two basic duties
are respecting the pursuit of happiness of other rational be-
ings, and, where possible, promoting their pursuit. Together
these pose to Wood the question: Whose happiness is the mat-
ter of the maxims for which the moral law is the formal prin-
ciple?
The matter of a form is some manifold of which the form is
a unifying principle of organization or structure. For
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example, the matter of inner sense is a manifold of repre-
sentations which time, the form of inner sense, arranges suc-
cessively. Similarly, it might he argued that pleasure is
the matter of one's own happiness, according to Kant, for
happiness is the idea of the totality of the satisfaction of
all inclinations. The pursuit of happiness thus involves
some kind of optimal organization of the manifold of plea-
sures which the inclinations aim at.
So, when the moral law provides a formal principle for
maxims, what is its matter? Maxims, for sure, but which ma-
xims? "Freedom is the formal condition of all maxims."
By
'all', Kant could not mean 'all one's own', for then
freedom
would be self-love. Therefore, 'all' must mean 'all of
everyone's'. Hence, the matter of Kant's formal
principle,
insofar as it pertains to happiness, cannot be some
indivi-
dual's. Rather, this matter must be some optimal
organiza-
tion of the manifold of hapf>inesses , and, if the moral
law
does indeed confer a moral status on happiness, it
must be on
collective happiness. Thus, Wood equivocates in his
argu-
ment, confusing maxims insofar as they are one's
own, with
maxims insofar as they are the principles of any
rational
agent. It is the happiness which is part of the
matter of
the latter, not of the former, which has a legitimate
claim
to moral significance. But if so, then the only
happiness
which is morally significant is collective happiness.
Mo-
rally significant subjective happiness would require a con-
straint-free principle of distribution.
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Universality and happiness in Kant’s ethics
The foregoing conjoins two concepts in a manner that is
rarely explicit in Kant's writings. Universality is, of
course, an important concept in his moral philosophy, and,
regardless of its status, happiness is a frequently discussed
topic. However, only infrequently do the two issues seem
to
intersenct. Still, it is not certain that the question of
universal happiness is far from Kant's mind.
Universality is of most importance to Kant because it is
the distinguishing property of objective practical prin-
ciples, as opposed to the individuality which characterizes
merely subjective maxims. While the matter of a maxim is its
expressed or implied purpose, its form is expressed by
the lo
gical quantity of agents for whom the principle is
valid as
a rule of action for the realization of that
purpose. Hence,
all subjective principles, i.e. maxims, have as their form
individuality. In contrast, the form of an objective prin-
ciple, i.e. a law, is universality. Thus, if
the criterion
of the morality of an action applies to the
question of the
form of the maxim, such a criterion is one which
abstracts
from the purpose of the action. And, of the
two species of
form, universality, not individuality, retains
that indiffer-
ence to subjective purposes. The si^ificance of this
pro-
perty of universality for Kant is that it can
serve as a
basis for a principle of morality which is
independent of ex-
perience. Purposes cannot serve as such a
basis, since they
the contingent existence of someall in part depend on
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sensible object. Thus, the mark of the morality of a maxim
lies in its fittingness to be a universal law.
In one sense, the one which seems to primary in Kant's
mind, to test a maxim by universalizing it seems to involve
determining whether or not it could be descriptive of a pat-
tern of events in which rational agents play a causal role.
For example, 'whenever a rational agent says "I promise to
repay you for a loan" while thinking contrarily, then another
rational agent to whom he is speaking hands over some money ,
would fail to describe a pattern of events, because sooner or
later the second agent would cease handing over some money.
Hence, a maxim which prescribes false promising as a means to
acquiring a loan is unfit to be a universal law, and so false
promising is immoral. The universality that this kind of
test involves thus seems meant to be entirely objective,
since it does not seem even to entail that agents involved
are moved by self-love, i.e. only their causality is
rele
vant
.
In another sense, though, the test could rely more
on a
subjective element. Whether or not a maxim were fit to be a
law could be determined by considering if the end of
the ma-
xim were one which at least one rational agent could
not have
Thus, someone naturally moved to pursue happiness
could not
have as his end being cheated by a false promiser.
False
promising could therefore not be a law of this victim's
ac-
tions, so on this ground the relevant maxim is unfit
to be a
law. Here it seems necessary to assume that one
of the
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participants is a subject of ends, and the conflict is one of
ends, and not one between a law and one of its would-be in-
stances. Kant does occasionally describe the universaliz-
ai3ility test with reference to ends, so the concept of uni-
versal ends is not entirely foreign to Kant's way of think-
ing, even if it rarely appears explicitly.
Still, one of. the first properties Kant attributes to
a
good will is the power to correct and adjust "to universal
ends"^^ any of a variety of subjective goods. In this con-
text it is unclear what the nature of these
universal ends
are. However he later clarifies the question
when introduc-
ing the concept of the end in itself:
"Rational nature ex-
ists as an end in itself. This is the way
in which a man ne-
cessarily conceives his own existence; it is
therefore so
far a subjective principle of human actions. But
it is also
the way in which every other rational being
conceives his ex-
istence on the same rational ground which is
valid also for
me; hence it is at the same time an
objective principle." ^
Thus, a subjective principle also has objective
validity.
But the subjective principle of rational action is
the desire
for happiness. Thus, objectively it is the desire
for happi-
ness of any rational being, so an end in
itself is a rational
being whose natural end is his own
happiness. Hence, when
Kant re-formulates the moral law as a
rule that requires the
respect of other rational beings as ends
in themselves, what
specifically requires respect is their pursuit
of happiness.
This becomes clear when what he proceeds
to explain as his
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conception of duties to others, the focus of these duties is
others' happiness. Therefore, when he speaks of adjusting
private goods to universal ends, he must mean harmonizing the
pursuit of one's happiness with that of every other rational
"being. This suggests that universal happiness is what uni-
versal ends concern.
This suggestion is confirmed in at least a couple of con-
texts. In his pre-Critical lecture 'The Ultimate Destiny of
the Hiiman Race' , Kant asserts, "The ultimate destiny of the
hviman race is the greatest moral perfection, provided that it
is achieved through hxunan freedom, whereby alone man is ca-
pable of the greatest happiness."^® This somewhat complex
statement implies that the value of freedom lies in its con-
tribution to happiness. It also implies at least that happi-
ness is a part of the ultimate destiny of the human race,
with moral perfection the other part, and possibly that mo-
ral perfection, like freedom, is but a means to happiness,
the entire human destiny.
A more refined version of this side of Kant's thinking is
expressed in the Critique of Pure Reason . There he describes
a purely intelligible moral world as a system of self-reward-
ing morality. In this world, "freedom, partly inspired and
partly restricted by moral laws, would itself be the cause of
general happiness, since rational beings, under the guidance
of such principles, would themselves be the authors of their
own enduring well-being and of that of others."
^ Unfortun-
ately, no individual can rely on the strict adherence to
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these laws hy any fallihle rational "being , but no one is
thereby excused from the obligations that the moral laws
dictate to them.
As purely intelligible, such a moral realm is unknowable.
However, it is thinkable, and what is conceivable about it
is its "practical law that maxims should be universally
va-
lid. In other words, the Fvindamental Law of Pure
Practic-
al Reason is. the principle of a system of self-rewarding
mo-
rality, as well as a formal condition of subjective action.
As such, it is therefore, also the formula for the
production
of general happiness. If so, in one respect, the
limiting
factor on the private pursuit of happiness that
the moral law
imposes is general happiness, regardless of the,
attitude of
others
.
There thus seems to be a quite definite and
quite central
strain of the moral law which aims at the
production of uni
versal happiness. It may therefore be
wondered why the con-
cern with universal happiness is not made
explicit in the
formulation of the moral law. What Kant says
about two other
formulations could answer this question.
Regarding a formu-
lation that involves ends in their totality,
he argues. It
is, however, better if in moral judgement we
proceed always
in accordance with the strict method and
take as our basis
the universal formula, by which he
means the formulation
given in the Fundamental Law. This
explanation is very ob-
scure, and so is unhelpful in explaining
the alleged disad-
vantages in making universal happiness an
explicit moral
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theme. Later, regarding the formulation that concerns res-
pect for others as ends, he argues that it is "at bottom the
same"^^ as the definitive version. Even if so, the suppres-
sion in the latter of refernce to general happiness is still
not justified.
The only passage which seems to explicitly state his posi-
tion on universal happiness is: "The principle of happiness
can indeed give maxims, but never maxims which are competent
to be laws of the will, even if universal happiness were
made the object. For, since knowledge of this rests on mere
data of experience, as each judgement concerning it depends
very much on the very changeable opinion of each person, it
can give general but never universal rules." Thus, to his
mind, a practical principle which required the promotion of
universal happiness is subject to the same criticism that ap-
plies to one which calls for the pursuit of individual hap-
piness. It is too trivial to effect the kind of harmoniza-
tion of individuals which the achievement of xmiversal happi-
ness requires. Application of such a principle would vary
from individual to individual, and would depend on
subjective
factors in perception. The result would be, as in
eudaimon-
ism, a heterogeneity of individual promotions of what
each
conceives universal happiness to consist in, with no
guaran-
tee that these individual conceptions are in harmony
with one
another.
One thing that this statement does not deny is that
uni-
versal happiness is a morally worthy end. At most
it denies
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that it could effectively ground any moral principle which
aspired to universal validity. It thus seems as if Kant
could be holding that universal happiness is indeed the end
of morality, but that as the expressed ground of a principle
of action it is ineffective. If Kant does hold this then the
justification of the moral law is that it is the most effect-
ive formula for the promotion of universal happiness. This
would confirm an interpretation of Kant that was introduced
above, namely, that the moral law is a regulatory principle
in the service of the sole end of his ethics, happiness.
Kant the utilitarian
One well-known advocate of the view that universal happi-
ness is the sole end of Kant's ethics, and that
the moral law
is a mere means to it, is John Stuart Mill. Mill
holds that
the general happiness is the sole end of any ethics,
and that
other goods or principles are subordinate to it.
This ethic-
al position is utilitarianism, and insofar as it
accurately
represents Kant’s ethics, Kant, too, is a
utilitarian.
Mill’s explanation of this classification is that
regard-
less of what Kant insists is a prerequisite
of a universal
moral principle, that universal happiness is
the sole moral
end is implicit in even Kant's own fundamental
law. More
specifically, it is the ultimate determinant of
the univers-
alizability of a maxim, even where Kant seems to
do without
it. For example, a maxim of false promising
would fail, not
on logical grounds, but only because ’’the
consequences of
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universal adoption would be such that no one would choose to
,,34incur . ^
Mill’s choice of words is slightly inaccurate, and has
thereby occasioned a justified but irrelevant criticism. It
sounds as if he is interpreting the test of \iniversalizabil-
ity as setting up an empirical standard of desirability
for
a maxim. That is, it seems as if he regards the
test as pro-
posing to the choosing agent to imagine a world where
the ma-
xim were descriptive of a pattern of practices,
and then
leaving it to the agent to decide if it would be
desirable
for him to live in such a world. But though
Kant occasional-
ly speaks in this way, the grounds of success
or failure to
be found in such a world are always logical,
i.e. whether or
not such a world involves a contradiction of
some sort, not
empirical in terms of the world’s desirability
or undesira-
bility for this particular choosing agent.
Beck, for one
criticizes^^ Mill for such a mis-reading of Kant.
Elsewhere, however. Mill suggests that he in
fact grasps
the meaning of the test. There he expresses
himself better
by observing that Kant "virtually
acknowledges that the in-
terest of mankind collectively, or at least
of mankind indis
criminately, must be in the mind of the agent
when conscien-
tiously deciding on the morality of the
act. //ith this
clarification, he seems to be suggesting
that even where the
universalizability test is at its purportedly
most objective
some subjective element will always be presupposed
and will
count as the decisive factor of the test.
For example, even
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where Kant judges on allegedly formal grounds alone that
false promising is immoral, because in no world could there
be a regularly occurring pattern of events consisting of the
issuing of the false promise, followed by the transference
of some money, collective interest is presupposed.
In par-
ticular, what is presupposed is that at least once
the issu-
ing of the promise will not be followed by such a
transfer.
But this presupposition itself assumes that the
collective
interest will be violated, i.e. that at least one
agent will
be unhappy over not getting repaid. For otherwise,
there is
no reason to assume that anyone would cease
handing over some
money. Of course, without the assumption of
self-interest at
all there is no reason to think that anyone
would ever get
involved in the practices of lending and promising
to begin
with. But, in -any case. Mill's point seems
to be that no
matter how formal Kant tries to make the test,
its ultimate
criterion is whether or not someone is made
unhappy by the
contemplated action. Unless there is a mistake
in Mill's
analysis, Kant, at least on this matter, can
correctly be
classified as a utilitarian.
Still, Mill needs to explain more if he
is to make the la-
bel stick. First and foremost, he needs
to explain how the
law which Kant regards as fundamental to
his ethics could
fact be a mere means. Second, he must
show how Kant's con-
cept of the highest good reduces to
the concept of universal
happiness. These two aspects of Kant's
theory seem to be its
least interpretable features for a
utilitarian.
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It has already "been suggested how Mill would handle the
first of these prohlems. The moral law implicitly requires
the promotion of universal happiness, while its particular
mode of explicit formulation reflects concerns that
are of a
secondary interest. Kant apparently concurs with Mill on
this when he agrees with another critic that his
ethics con-
tains "no new principle of morality in it, hut only
a new
formula. Kant's secondary interest here would
seem to he
epistemological. As has already been discussed, the
concep-
tion of any object of morality that involves happiness, must
in part he empirical, and, hence, contingent.
In other
words, what is decisive in the formulation that
Kant chooses,
is its capturing of the universality of universal
happiness,
in its appeal to universal reason. In contrast,
reference in
a rule to happiness of any sort involves
sensibility in the
application of the rule, thereby introducing subjective con-
tingencies. Therefore, because liniversality is
insensible
according to his epistemological principles, does
Kant offer
a formulation of the requirement to promote
universal happi-
ness as a law which abstracts from sensible
conditions like
happiness. And, it is only because of this,
according to
Mill, since the epistemological insight
merely serves to mod
ify the ethical one. If universal
happiness were not the
end, then Kant would have a different
fundamental principle.
But then, if universal happiness were
the end, it would have
to be Kant's highest good.
33
Universal hapuiness as Kant's highesi: ^ood
This leads to the second problem for a utilitarian inter-
pretation of Kant’s ethics. It needs to show that on the ba-
sis of its own principles, universal happiness is the high-
est good. In order to do this it must account for the
three
salient features of what Kant says his highest good is.
That
is, it must account for virtue, it must account
for indivi-
dual happiness, and it must account for the relation
between
virtue and happiness.
The clue to a utilitarian representation of virtue
is gi-
ven in Mill’s remark that "the best proof of a
good charac-
ter is good actions."^® This comment suggests
a metaphysical
dispute between Mill and Kant that actually
poses a great
difficulty for Kant. Mill is casually implying
here that the
concept of virtue is exhausted by the actions
which are per-
formed in the effort to aci on maxims which
satisfy the con-
ditions of the moral law. Less casually
behind this implica-
tion, whether or not Mill intends it, is
the criticism that
nothing other than the consequences of these
actions could
count as an effect of freedom. Kant has
no ground for cate-
gorizing a dispostion like virtue as an
’effect’, since an
•effect’ is sensible according to the first
Critique, unlike
some causes. Even an imagined effect
is possible only
through the imagination of would-be
phenomena. But no pheno-
menon is adequate to a disposition,
so Mill is on solid
ground with this interpretation of
virtue. As a result,
since a good is an effect of rational
agency for Kant, to say
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that virtue is the unconditional good is to say that the
consequences of actions performed out of obedience to the mo-
ral lav/ are what the supreme good consists in.
Now, Kant's moral lav/ prescribes two kinds of duties,
those to oneself and those to others. As has been discussed
above, duties to others involve the respect for and promotion
of the happiness of others. Thus, immediately, half the
su-
preme good is the happiness of others.
On the other hand, the duty to oneself is to promote
one's
own perfection. This is a two-fold project, including both
"the cultivation of one's powers (or natural capacities)
and
the cultivation of one's will (moral attitude) to
fulfill
every duty as such."^^ In terms of effects it
is easy to
see what perfection amounts to. Natural capacities
are ex-
haustively accounted for by the use they are put
to; but the
moral law constrains their use'. The same holds
true of the
cultivation of the moral attitude. But since the
only ef-
fects of moral constraint are promotions of the
happiness of
others, the good of this kind of duty is
redundant.
Still, this representation of Kant's concept
of virtue
seems to omit an aspect of self-cultivation
that is not mere-
ly dispositional. This aspect stems
from the special self-
relation that autonomy involves, emerging
as self-generated
progress, and explains the distinction
between intentional
and non-intentional action. Now, Mill
could dismiss the last
as a metaphysical irrelevancy, but a
failure to represent the
first two adequately enough could spell
failure for the
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QYi-txvQ project of representing Kent as a utilitarian. How-
ever, Kant himself suggests a satisfactory solution. One
further effect of freedom is inner contentment, the pleasure
that accompanies the consciousness of mastery over inclin- -
.
ations in acting morally. The presence of such self-satis-
faction suffices to indicate autonomy, and the depth
of its
presence is a measure of one's progress in self-cultivation.
This certainly qualifies as happiness of a special
kind, as
long as its autonomous nature is kept in mind. As
Kant him-
self puts it, what distinguishes self-cultivation
from for-
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tune is "inner happiness.
With this utilitarian interpretation of Kantian
virtue,
why virtue is an incomplete good becomes much
clearer. If
the effects of virtuous activity are the
happiness of others
and one’s self-satisfaction, then what is
lacking in terms of
universal happiness is the self-satisfaction
of others and
one’s own happiness. But since the highest
good for Kant
an object of an individual’s will, the
self-satisfaction of
others c^ot be included as one of the effects
possible
through an individual’s freedom. Hence,
its absence in the
highest good does not gainsay that universal
happiness is the
highest good, and, so, virtue is not an
incomplete good mere-
ly because it may not produce the
self-satisfaction of oth-
ers. In contrast, one’s own
happiness is still lacking,
which shows why Kant maintains that
virtue without happiness
is not wholly good. However, once
he does include
highest good does add up to universal
happiness.
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Still, the utilitarian explanation of the specific order-
ing relation between virtue and happiness that Kant's highest
good entails, is as yet lacking. That is, it needs to ex-
plain the proportionality between virtue and happiness. As
has already been argued, these two are logically distinct
features of the highest good, because only the former
presup-
poses virtue. In the latter relation, proportionality
is a
condition even where virtue is lacking. What the two
have in
common, though, is not so much the status of virtue,
but
rather the peculiar status of happiness as a highest
yet
somehow subordinated good. Despite this commonality,
they
express two different reasons why happiness is
not an uncon-
ditioned good.
In the first place, it is not unconditional
because it
lacks a property which virtue possesses. At
bottom, it is
not an effect of freedom, or, to put it
another way, one's
own happiness is not a duty. According
to Wood, as mentioned
above, one's own happiness is not a Kantian
duty because it
is already a natural end, and, so, to
specify it as a duty
would be superfluous. Wood seems to be
right about this,
this by itself does not explain why the
the happiness of oth-
ers is a duty. It is the view of Mill
that humans possess
"the desire to be in unity with our
fellow creatures,
which makes sympathy for others also
a natural
is right, then as a duty the happiness
of others, too, is su-
perfluous. Kant, however, disagrees
with Mill, since he can-
not "presuppose in every rational being’’''^
^ sympathetic
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disposition. But the very disputability of this point indi-
cates that the grounds for classifying the happiness of oth-
ers, but not one's own, as a duty, is arbitrary. If so, then
on the grounds that every rational being is an end in
itself,
one's own person is an end in itself, whereby since it is
a
duty to respect and promote the happiness of any
end in it-
self, one's own happiness is a duty. In other
words, since
the moral distinction between one's own happiness
and that of
others is arbitrarily drawn by Kant, the former
is as uncon-
ditional as the latter. In which case, the
utilitarian can
deny the distinction between a supreme and a
secondary good
that Kant invokes.
In the second place, the meaning of the
proportionality
between morality and happiness has already
been hinted at.
Regardless of whether the judge of worthiness is
a human or
is a divine rational being, -the calculation
of the amount of
happiness can occur in only one way. Now,
a moral action,
according to Kant, limits the natural
desire for happiness
and promotes the happiness of others.
Clearly, the amount of
deserved happiness is the amount one
has contributed to oth-
ers, since the happiness of others
is the only kind of happi-
ness that has a direct causal
connection to moral action, in
Kant's system. This explains why
one is in some sense worthy
of this compensation while at the
some time powerless
alise it. compensation, on the one
hand, is based on one's
j. +V.O n+ViPT is dependenb on external
moral efforts, but, on the other,
o
through the reciprocation
cooperation for realisation, either
rn
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of others, among whose duties is one's own happiness, or
through the reward of a disinterested and omnipotent judge.
But then, this concept of proportionality proves to he no-
thing but an interesting aspect of the problem df -doTOpeii^ /
^
sation within the context of the individual's promotion of
universal happiness. This confirms the utilitarian insight
that Kant is at heart a fellow utilitarian.
Conclusions
The strength of this utilitarian appropriation of
Kant’s
ethics could provide Beck with sufficient grounds
for reject-
ing Wood’s position. The utilitarian shows that
for Kant to
accord any moral status at all to happiness,
unavoidably com-
mits him to utilitarianism. But utilitarianism
degrades au-
tonomy and the moral law, subordinating them
both to univers
al happiness. Thus, Beck could conclude,
Wood is wrong to
defend the position that happiness is a good
in Kant’s eth-
ics. Hence, the best Kantian position is
to admit that hap-
piness has no moral status, and to reject Kant's
concept of
the highest good as a mistake.
As long as Wood is unable to deny
that the happiness of
others, like that of one's own. is not
a natural end, as Mill
maintains, he opens the gates to
utilitarianism and universal
happiness. But nor is it so clear that
Beck could defend
Kant against utilitarian degradation.
Beck's Kantianism is
based on the letter of the moral law.
However, unless he oan
demonstrate that the law's universalizability
test does not
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presuppose "the collective iniseresi, us Mill has argued, ihai
it does, then utilitarianism is implicit in that very law.
Also, given what little Kant does say about universal happi-
ness as a moral principle, it is just not certain that he
would reject the utilitarian thesis. To argue that Kant’s
ethics is more interesting, more complex, and more
fruitful
than Mill’s, could be nothing more than to argue
that Kant is
a more interesting, complex, and fruitful
utilitarian than
Mill is, strangely enough.
One philosopher who agrees with Mill that Kant’s
ethics
has a strong utilitarian strain to it is
Schopenhauer. Scho-
penhauer. however, goes further, and interprets
Kant’s utili-
tarianism as a disguised eudaimonism.
Schopenhauer is sharp-
ly critical of this side of Kant’s ethics,
and tries to ex-
tirpate its eudaimonistic elements. He is
thus a proponent
of the view that true Kanti'anism regards
happiness as an
evil, and as the central problem of
ethics. Like Beck, then,
he rejects Kant’s concept of the highest good,
or so it would
seem
.
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CHAPTER 2
SCHOPENHAUER'S CRITICISM OF KANT'S ETHICS
Introduction
In my first chapter, I tried to show that the concept of
the highest good stands as a controversial problem in Kant's
ethics, and I suggested that there are three possible ap-
proaches to the problem. After considering two of these,
namely Beck's and Wood's, I concluded that a utilitarian in-
terpretation of Kant, one suggested by Mill, could absorb
them and make a powerful claim on Kant's apparently anti-
utilitarian views. Without an adequate counter to such a
claim, as I argued neither Beck nor Wood can supply, Mill's
contention that Kant is a latent utilitarian must be correct.
In this chapter, I first want to pursue the latter pos-
sihility to its limits. What will emerge at that point is
what I had originally designated as the third representative
voice in this controversy. This voice is that of Schopenhau-
er, and for the most part of this chapter I will be discus-
sing in some detail Schopenhauer's criticism of Kant's eth-
ics, and how it applies in particular to the concept of the
highest good in dispute. Once Schopenhauer's position is
established, I will then argue that it provides a defense
which rescues Kant from the utilitarians. As will become ev-
ident, though, the price of rescue is the jettisoning of a
eudaimonistic strain in Kant's ethics, and even then,:, it:
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will not be certain that what remains is not still vulnerable
to a further appropriative attempt by the utilitarian. It
will be at that juncture that Nietzsche appears on the scene.
Difficulties in applying utilitarianism to Kant’s ethics
Much of the utilitarian interpretation of Kant’s ethics
which I have presented is admittedly of a highly speculative
nature, and it is not easy to evaluate the force of such an
interpretation without clarifying several key Issues. Since
only one or two of those issues is of interest in these
pages, I will bypass many of the other possibly important
questions which I have raised. Still, a brief discussion of
two gray areas will suggest how answers to the latter ques-
tions could be developed, and in the process will lend sup-
port to my more relevant speculations.
The first gray area is the utilitarian's account of Kant's
treatment of moral agency. Kant's concept of freedom is the
cornerstone of his ethics, and any faithful interpretation of
his views must retain this status for that concept. Now,
utilitarianism is a consequentialist approach to ethics, and
it will thus have difficulty conferring primacy on any ap-
parently non-consequentialist concept like Kantian freedom.
According to the account I have proposed, the utilitarian can
uniquely represent freedom by inner contentment, which Kant
admits is a consequence of free agency. Still it is not
clear that a unique representation is an adequate one, so it
is not clear that the utilitarians can achieve adequacy here.
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•//hat is a gray area here is a problem with the scope of
ut ilitariarism f which dates to at least Mill’s conception, of
its principles. As suggested above, the utilitarian main-
tains that the epistemic and psychological considerations
which lead Kant to the formulation of the moral law, are con-
siderations which are framed by the implicit assumption that
universal happiness is the highest good, and, so, are of an
interest which is secondary in relation to that assumption.
Mill, for one, is maintaining this when, in Utilitarianism
,
he subordinates the question of moral agency to the question
of desirable consequences of action. Nevertheless, it is un-
clear that this subordination exhaustively represents his
views, since he wrote ^this work having already championed, in
On Liberty
,
human freedom, but without addressing this earli-
er view in the later work.
There is no reason to think that Mill's utilitarianism
disavows his libertatianism, so the bearing of the latter on
the former remains an unexplored question. It is certainly
relevant to the former, but in what respect it is not immedi-
ately easy to say. In any case, what is therefore also an
unexplored question is the possible affinity between Mill's
concept of free agency from his libertarianism, and Kant's
concept of the end in itself. I speculate that the utilitar-
ian who recognizes such libertarianism as its complement is
likely to reconsider the subordination of agency to conse-
quences, and, so, is likely to become more appreciative of
the role in ethics of Kant's freedom-grounded moral law. On
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the other hand, though, the rapprochement on this point could
conversely serve to xmderscore the utilitarian implicity of
Kant's presuppositions.
The second gray area involves an ambiguity which I have
only barely touched upon. This concerns Kant's concept of
happiness, which, as Wood maintains,^ is a rational idea,
since it represents a totality, regardless of which ordering
principle imifies the manifold of satisfactions. Neverthe-
less, Kant later, in the Groundwork
,
insists that "happiness
is an Ideal, not of reason but of imagination—an Ideal rest-
.
. 2ing on empirical grounds." He soon after makes it clear
that what he has all along been criticizing as the "principle
3
of happiness"-^ is empirical, which means that his criticisms
do not necessarily pertain to any rational concept of uni-
versal happiness.
That there may be more than one concept of happiness, and
more than one rational concept of happiness in Kant's ethics,
touches on the second area which is gray. This is the scarc-
ity in his writings of explicit reference to the concept, ra-
tional or empirical, of universal happiness, a scarcity which
is especially frustrating to the utilitarian v/ho claims that
Kant's ethics is committed to its primacy. Hov/ever, his one
brief criticism of the concept in the second Critique clear-
ly treats it as an empirical concept, which gives the utili-
tarian a foothold. For, an imaginative representation of
universal happiness is not a rational Idea of the totality of
the satisfactions of all human needs, and the contingency of
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the former as the ground of a moral law does not imply the
contingency of the latter as such a ground.
Thus, because happiness in the rational sense could be a
totality of general satisfactions as much as it could be one
of individual satisfactions, there is in Kant's theory the
makings of a concept of universal happiness which is not sub-
ject to his criticism of empirically grounded moral prin-
ciples. Developing such a concept, in addition to making
more of libertarian agency, could help the utilitarian bring
Kant more smoothly into the utilitarian fold, but such a
project is not of primary interest here.
The utilitarian analysis of Kant's highest good
What in the utilitarian accoxmt is relevant how is the an-
alysis of Kant's highest good which it offers. I have tried
to show that it represents that concept more thoroughly than
do either Beck or Wood, and I have preliminarily set out how
it might resolve their differences. I will now turn to these
matters in more detail, especially since this analysis also
illuminates the approach which Schopenhauer takes to Kant s
ethics.
Emphasized by the utilitarian analysis is Kant's distinc-
tion between "the highest good for one person" and "that of a
possible world. The same breath in which Kant mentions
them tends to obscure the possibility here of a distinction,
as does the subsequent textual inattention to this point of
difference. Whether or not Kant thinks that there are two
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distinct concepts of the highest good is not easy to tell
from the relevant passages, but the utilitarian analysis
makes it clear that what is at the bottom of the dispute be-
tween Beck and Wood is the difference between these two ver-
sions of the concept.
The highest good for one person is virtue together with
happiness, with the specification that virtue without happi-
ness is a good, while happiness without virtue is not.
Though virtue without happiness is a good, it is neverthe-
less incomplete, in which case happiness must be added to
perfect it. As has been seen above, the utilitarian regards
the separate reference to happiness as a superfluity which
arises from Kant's groundless exclusion of personal happiness
from the effects entailed by the concept of virtue. That is,
if the effect of virtuous action is the promotion of the hap-
piness of rational beings, then the distinction betv/een one's
ovm happiness and the happiness of other rational beings is
irrelevent, and if the promotion of the latter is a duty,
then so too is that of the former. Why Kant regards happi-
ness and virtue as complementary is mysterious, until the
utilitarian represents them as one's ovm happiness and the
happiness of others, respectively, namely, as complementary
components of universal happiness.
It can now be seen that in arguing against Beck, Wood is
invoking the concept of the highest good qua that of one per-
son. To justify his contention that the highest good is a
practical concept, he tries to show that a person's "ovm
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happiness is included in a sysiemaliic way wiihin "the ends of
his moral action."^ He discusses an example where one acts
in the interest of justice, and in so doing one alleviates
the general suffering resulting from the injustice, includ-
ing one's ov/n. His conclusion is that personal happiness can
be an end of moral action, and, hence, that it is justifiably
included as a practical component of the highest good.
Clearly, Wood is in some sense challenging the exclusion of
personal happiness from the ends of moral action, and, so,
the highest good which he is defending here is primarily that
of one person.
On the other hand, though, he seems less attentive to the
highest good of a possible world. The concept of the highest
good of a possible world links happiness to virtue on the ba-
sis of a proportion. This suggests that in such a v/orld,
partially virtuous beings deserve partial happiness, in which
case happiness is not conceived as a complement to virtue,
even if it turns out that way in one case, namely, in the
case of the completely virtuous. The utilitarian analysis
suggests that the amoimt of happiness which one deserves is a
function of the amount of happiness which one contributes to
others through moral action. Deserved happiness is thus re-
ciprocation on the basis of the principles of distributive
justice. Kant confirms this analysis when he discusses the
concept of a self-rewarding morality. In such a world, all
happiness is deserved, but deserved happiness fails to be the
effect of action only when "others do not act in conformiity
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with the law." His concept of the highest good of a pos-
sible world is thus the concept of a self-rewarding morality
where universal morality is not taken for granted.
v/ood's example does not shov/ how someone can deserve hap-
piness even where a just action is irrelevant to their per-
sonal happiness, especially where such an agent is personally
not unhappy, in which case the further desire for deserved
happiness seems like greed. Nor does his example give a clue
as to hov; proportionality is to be conceived. Now, Wood
might v/ant to argue that any action v/hich promotes justice at
least potentially benefits its agent, in order to deny the
possibility of a just action which is irrelevant to its
agent s happiness, and, so, to rule out greedily desired de-
served happiness. But he still cannot derive from this a
concept of proportionate happiness without recourse to inde-
pendent theoretical principles. Hence, the concept of the
highest good which depends on those principles is at best of
secondary interest to Wood.
In contrast. Beck's arguments are on behalf of what V7ood
has subordinated. He maintains that "the connection between
virtue and happiness in the highest good is made possible in
an intelligible world
. .
. called a 'system of self-rev^'ard-
ing morality.'"'^ Consequently, for him, Kant's concept of
the highest good for a person is equivalent to the concept of
the inhabitation by a virtuous person in a good world, where-
by the concept of a happy virtuous person is derivative.
This, therefore, clarifies Beck's insistence that deserved
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happiness is not a practical concept. For, on this equiva-
lence, the only end of pure practical reason is virtue. In
contrast, happiness gets linked to virtue only through the
aforementioned theoretical concept of a world defined hy a
law of proportioning happiness to virtue, one instance of
which obtains v;hen everyone is virtuous and everyone is hap-
py through their combined moral activities.
The utilitarian analysis thus gets to the heart of what is
at issue between Wood and Beck. They are not so much dis-
puting whether or not the highest good is a practical concept
for Kant. Rather, they are really arguing over v/hich is tru-
ly the latter's concept of the highest good: that, of a per-
son or that of a possible world. The former concept is
plausibly practical, but the latter clearly is not. They are
also at the same time in dispute over which concept is the
highest practical good: virtue complemented by happiness, or
virtue by itself. Now, in the latter aspect of the dispute
there is one easy resolution, since the utilitarian analysis
shov.'s that personal happiness is implicitly among the effects
of virtue, making virtue conceptually equivalent to virtue
complemented by happiness. On this basis, Wood is correct in
maintaining that virtue complemented by personal happiness is
the highest practical good in Kant's ethics. At the same
time, though. Beck still stands unchallenged in maintaining
that what for Kant is the highest good for a possible v/orld
is a theoretical concept. Beyond this level of resolution,
however, it is unclear whether the utilitarian regards the
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practical end of universal happiness, or the theoretical end
of justly distributed general happiness, as the higher good.
What has gone unexamined so far is a further element in
the utilitarian analysis. As has been seen, its interpreta-
tion of Kant must represent inner contentment, in order to
distinguish mere universal happiness from a universal happi-
ness which is the product of human agency. The former, but
not the latter, could be an effect of divine benificence or
wise government, and so does not necessarily entail freedom
or virtue. But- if inner contentment is freedom from desire,
then it is unclear why a completely virtuous person is in
need of external happiness, as both the utilitarian and Wood
maintain. Nor is it clear why a partially virtuous person
would expect compensation or reciprocation for just action.
To the contrary, it seems that one's ovm external happiness
could never be an effect of virtue, since virtue is accom-
O
panied by "independence from" the needs whose satisfaction
constitutes happiness. This raises a suspicion about Kant's
highest good which the utilitarian analysis tends to encour-
age. The best-known articulater of this suspicion is Scho-
penhauer.
Schopenhauer as a critic of Kant's eudaimonism
In my first chapter I introduced the question of the un-
settled status of the desire for happiness in Kant's ethics,
by showing that in different passages Kant takes apparently
different stances tov/ard that status. In one passage, he
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seems to be suggesting that the pursuit of happiness is in
itself morally neutral, and that it is otherwise only as an
evil when in conflict with duty. In another passage, he
seems to suggest that there is a condition under which happi-
ness is morally desirable. A proponent of the former stance
is- Beck, v;ho, as a result, denies that personal happiness
can under any condition be regarded as a practical good ac-
cording to Kantian principles. In contrast, a proponent of
the latter stance is Wood, who, as a result, defends the
claim that virtue together v/ith happiness is the highest :
practical good according to Kantian principles. According to
utilitarianism, though, the differences betv/een Beck and Wood
are only minor, in that they are products of the latter mak-
ing explicit what the former leaves implicit, namely that
personal happiness is the happiness of one rational being,
and, so, is included among the effects of moral action.
Hov/ever, a third stance has not yet been examined. This
is the one which endorses those passages where Kant seems to
be suggesting that morality is essentially in conflict with
the pursuit of happiness, and can tolerate no compromise with
it, such as acknowledging its moral neutrality. The propon-
'
ent of this interpretation, like Beck, rejects any construal
according to Kantian principles of happiness as a moral good,
and, so, emerges as another critic of his highest good. Un-
like Beck, though, this critic v/ill reject even a theoretical
concept of the highest good which includes personal happi-
ness, and will regard a practical version which includes it
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The earlier and the later Kant
In the explanation of his position, Schopenhauer attacks
several of the salient features of Kant's philosophy, v/hile
also insisting on the recognition that v/ithin its mature
phase Kant's philosophy undergoes a significant shift. His
insistence on this matter is fueled by his alarm that the
pre-altered version of that philosophy, which he strongly
prefers, was being suppressed in his time. The main perpe-
trators of this suppression, according to Schopenhauer, were
Schelling, Fichte, and, most notably, Hegel, and much of what
he says about Kant is an attempt to revise unfortuate verbal
formulations from the earlier phase, which he thinks breed
Hegelian Kantianism. For Hegel, such formulations are dis-
posable, since they are merely underdeveloped versions of the
later formulations. Schopenhauer's semantical criticism is
an attempt to resurrect the earlier ones as expressions of a
distinct and even worthier philosophy. But this semantical
enterprise is not to be confused with his fundamentally eth-
ical criticism of w'hat turns out to be Kant's later, possibly
more Hegelian, phase.
Schopenhauer dates the shift in question to the mid-1780s,
when Kant begins to ontologize the intellectual structures.
He regards the first edition of the first Critique and the
Groundwork as typical of the earlier phase, and the second
Cx*itique and the second edition 'Of the first as typ-
ical of Kant's leaning towards ontology. The popularity of
the later view is seen in the fact that the first edition
of
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the first Critique was out of print from "1?87 to 1838,"^^
reappearing only through Schopenhauer's own efforts. In con-
trast with the prevailing Hegelian, Fichtean, and Schelling-
ian accounts of Kant's development, Schopenhauer sees Kant as
deteriorating in health after 1785, causing him to settle un-
resolved questions in a hasty and compromising manner that
encourages those three rivals.
To perhaps too briefly discuss here an important issue, in
order to bring out one pertinent point, Kant's alleged onto-
logizing of intellectual structures, characterized in some
contemporary circles as a transformation from 'subjectivism
to 'phenomenalism', affects, according to Schopenhauer,
Kant's ethical theory as well as his metaphysics and epis-
temology. According to subjectivism, things are nothing but
procedures for organizing sensory input, but phenomenalism
reifies these structural procedures, and posits their
per-
ceiver independent existence. Along the sane lines,
whereas
for the earlier Kant Ideas of reason are strictly
heuristic,
his later view admits the existence of a 'fact' of
practical
reason.
Kant's second Critique is thus an ontologization
of some
of the main features of the ^undwqrk, according to
Schopen-
hauer, and it is not, as a result, without its
own peculiar
legacy. This legacy is the personal happiness
which reason
now requires as a complement to virtue.
Schopenhauer thus
regards the second Critique as backsliding resolution
of some
unsettled, and, perhaps, infelicitously formulated,
features
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of the Groundwork . It is the former work,
with its culmina-
tion in the concept of the highest good, which
advocates the
eudaimonism which Schopenhauer criticizes.
Schopenhauer on Kant and the intelligible world,
The point of departure for Schopenhauer's
criticism of
Kanfs ethics is the metaphysical position which
he believes
he inherits from Kant. According to
this position, "all
plurality is only apparent, ... in all
individuals of this
world, however infinite the number in
which they exhibit
themselves successively and simultaneously,
there is yet man-
ifested only one and the same truly
existing essence, pre-
sent and identical in all of them.
"1" Schopenhauer is.
hence, a kind of dualist, distinguishing
between the plural-
istic world of appearance and the
unitary intelligible world.
According to his interpretation of Kant,
this distinction
corresponds to Kant's distinction between
appearances and the
thing-in- itself
.
In at least one passage. Kant
seems to substantiate this
correspondance. when he notes the
"distinction, howewer
rough, between the sensible world
and the intelligible world,
the first of which can vary a great
deal according to differ-
ences of sensibility in sundry
observers, while the second,
which is its ground, always remains
the same." However.
Whether or not he is in agreement
here with Schopenhauer de-
pends on a further clarification.
For. an undifferentiated
Intelligible world like Schopenhauer's
is not necessarily
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identical to an unchanging intelligible world like the one
Kant is here describing. Indeed, v^hen Kant does clarify his
concept, he refers to it as "the totality of the rational
beings as things in themselves," that is, as a different-
iated realm.
At first glance, it seems as if the difference in their
respective construals of the intelligible world yields no
striking divergence in their ethical principles. For Schop-
enhauer, because the intelligible world is a feature which
is
"one and identical in all"^^ phenomenal agents, morality
con-
sists in treating the ego of another as "equal with"^
one's
ovm. Kant, on the other hand, shows no sign of
disagreeing
with this moral conclusion when defending the principle
of
treating others as ends in themselves. His argument
is that
"this is the way a man necessarily conceives his own
exist-
ence . . . but it is also the way in v/hich every
other ra-
tional being conceives his existence on the same
rational
ground which is valid for me."^^ Regardless,
then, of wheth-
er or not the intelligible is construed as
undifferentiated,
in both philosophies its moral influence is
the equalization
of beings who on merely sensible grounds may
be of unequal
value
.
Nor is Schopenhauer specifically concerned
about possible
logical difficulties with Kant's notion of
a plurality of in.
telligible selves. Such difficulties attach
to the point
that Kant leaves no grounds for
differentiating distinct in
telligible selves, in which case he has no
grounds for
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maintaining that a plurality of them exist, leaving Schopen-
hauer with a sounder conception of the intelligible world.
Furthermore, as R. P. Wolff points out,^^ Kant faces diffi-
culties v/ith this notion on a more complex level. According
to V/olff's analysis, Kant is committed to holding that one
empirical world exists, that': one. intelligible world exists,
that a plurality of empirical selves inhabit the empirical
world, and that a plurality of intelligible selves inhabit
the intelligible world. However, he is also committed to
holding that an empirical world can be the product of a syn-
thesis by the transcendental ego of only one intelligible
self. But if so, then he is committed to denying that there
exist a plurality of intelligible selves. Now, as will be
seen, Schopenhauer indeed presents an alternative conception
to Kant's of the various interrelations between these selves
and worlds, but he does not reject Kant's. Rather, he holds
that Kant "gave only the premises, from which he has drav/n
the correct conclusion.
One obvious feature of Kant's intelligible world is that
its essential characteristic is rationality. Now here would
seem to be an equally obvious point of divergence for Schop-
enhauer, v/ho, in The World as Will and Representation, main-
tains that the in-itself is undifferentiated irrational will.
Indeed, a criticism of Kant's concept of reason is at the
heart of Schopenhauer's reaction to his ethics, but not, as
will be seen, with immediate respect to the metaphysical
question concerning the rationality of .the intelligible.
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Schopenhauer on reason in a;eneral in Kant' s ethics
Schopenhauer concurs with Kant that reason in general is
the power of inference, by means of which one can "apprehend
the particular in the universal through concepts. He also
agrees that it is legitimate to employ, as Kant does, this
power to maximally unify the realm of appearance, provided
that the universals which serve as the point of convergence
of manifold appearances are not hypostasized. Schopenhauer
only mildly complains here about Kant's use of the term
'Idea' to refer to these heuristic universals, based on his
ov/n Platonic committments.
What Schopenhauer is more insistent about is not conflat-
ing reason with other combinatory procedures with which it is
often conjoined. His earliest work, The Fourfold Root of the
Principle of Sufficient Reason
,
aims at disentangling these.
He argues there that the principle of sufficient reason de-
fines „a generic, a priori
,
combinatory procedure v/hich has
application to empirical representations in four different
ways. Generically, what is combined is a ground with a con-
sequence, and the apprehension of the particular in the uni-
versal is the epistemic mode of such combination. Reason is
thus to be distinguished from the combination of a cause with
an effect, and from the combination of a motive with an ac-
tion, according to Schopenhauer. Moreover, these distinc-
tions must not be obscured when these various combinatory
procedures cooperate with one another.
6o
Reason, on this account, is thus never causal or motiva-
tional of its own accord, and, so, Schopenhauer is challeng-
ing any Kantian claims to the contrary. These challenges
amount to his showing that v/henever Kant implicates reason in
a motivational configuration of representations, reason is
never the motivational factor. In most cases, Schopenhauer
recognizes that his challenge is merely semantical, since in
these it is only Kant's misleading formulations which suggest
that he thinks that reason is itself motivational. However,
in other cases, Kant seems to take himself literally, thereby
leading him to lapse into eudaimonism, according to Schopen-
hauer .
In restricting reason to the episteraic sphere, Schopen-
hauer is not depriving it of any of its power. To the con-
trary, this delimitation serves to highlight its versatility.
To categorize reason as epistemic is to characterize the
knowledge of a universal proposition as justification for be-
lieving that a particular which is apprehended in it, through
concepts, is true. Conversely, belief in the truth of a uni-
versal necessitates belief in the truth of any particular
which falls under it. These are two fundamental epistemic
laws of reason which are valid for the beliefs of any ration-
al creature
.
Reason, thus, has a variety of functions. It can increase
the number of beliefs v/hich one holds. By increasing the
number of true beliefs one holds it can increase one s ob-
jective knowledge. By the same means, it can also increase
6l
one's objective self-knov/ledge . On the other hand, it can
eliminate a belief v/hich contradicts another. It can fur-
thermore eliminate false beliefs, including those concerning
one's self. In this v/ay it dissipates ignorance.
There are therefore a variety of grounds for accepting
the validity of the laws of reason. First, as already men-
tioned, a being which regards itself as rational will thereby
regard these laws as valid for itself. Second, contingent on
the truth value of its universal, belief in a particular is
at least partially justified for a certitude-seeking being,
v/ho will thus accept the validity of these laws at least
partially. Third, they will be accepted by the seeker of
self-knowledge, whom reason can abet in this search. Fourth,
they are at least partially valid for one who wants to eli-
minate inconsistencies in beliefs held, even if none of them
are objectively true. Finally, for someone seeking to reduce
disagreement with others, reason can assist in gaining pos-
session of beliefs which are least likely to conflict with
those which others hold, namely, true beliefs, whereby the
laws of reason will also be regarded as valid.
Because, and only because, according to Schopenhauer,
of
the distinctively human nature of human action, reason
can
assist in the determination of such action. Like all
organic
activity, human action is nothing but a response to
an ex-
ternal stimulus. As is the case with all animals,
such a
stimulus is a perceived motivation, but as opposed
to what
stimulates all other animals, uniquely human motivation
need
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not "be a present perception. Humans, alone, can be moved by
the mere representation of stimuli, v/hich does not imply that
any such representation can be derived from anything other
than some empirical perception. So, since the object of a
belief is a representation, reason does have access to the
motivational conatus.
This access, however, is of a limited sort. The human co-
natus is fundamentally a function of the interface between
the nature of the represented motive and the psycho-physical
character of the particular motivated individual, and it
transpires with mechanical necessity. Reason can at most
modify certain stages of the conatus, by helping to supply
the knowledge that can clarify the nature of a given motive
or personal character, that can amplify or anticipate a re-
mote motive, or that can expedite the responding action.
Functioning this way, reason is instrumental, but its basic
character remains epistemic, or, theoretical.
Reason that is highly developed instrumentally can there-
fore discover efficacious motives and what reactions to them
would realize, as well as choose among likely alternative
paths to such realization. The complex product of this ra-
tional activity is a belief about oneself which Kant calls a
'maxim*. Hence, from Schopenhauer's point of view, the maxim
' I will do X in order to achieve Y' is an expression of the
belief about oneself that one is being motivated to achieve
Y, and that X is the best means to that end. Because reason
here helps determine v/hich action is taken, it is practical.
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and it is empirical, decause knowledge of the motive is sens-
ible .
Along the same lines, a Kantian ’hypothetical imperative',
i.e. 'Do X, if you want to achieve Y'
,
is an expression of
the belief that any human who does X will achieve Y. With
respect to such an imperative, obedience consists in regard-
ing oneself as a particular under the universal in question.
This leads to the Schopenhauerian explanation of Kant's an-
swers to the central questions of the Groundv/ork : \\Tiat does
a categorical imperative say? and How does it determine human
action?
Schopenhauer on reason in the Groundwork
Kant's supreme moral principle sets a condition for the
adoption or rejection of maxims as grounds of action. This
condition is that a maxim be universalizable if it is to be
adopted. Hence, if the universalization of a maxim implies
a contradiction, then it is to be rejected. Clearly, there-
fore, this condition concerns nothing more than the laws of
theoretical reason. So, if, as Schopenhauer maintains, the-
oretical reason is strictly epistemic in scope, then Kant's
moral principle is expressible in strictly epistemic terms,
as setting a condition on the holding of a species of belief.
A maxim is a particular hypothetical proposition which is
believed when it is adopted. The condition of universaliz-
ability has two facets: first, with regard to the scope of
the proposition that is believed, second, with respect to its
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believability . The first of these facets is expressed in
Kant's 'law of nature' version of the supreme principle,
v/hile the second is presented in his 'end in itself formu-
lation. The 'universal' formulation means to combine both
facets
.
To require that a particular hypothetical proposition be
universalizable v/ith respect to its scope is, in epistemic
terms, to require that one be completely justified in believ-
ing it. Such complete justification obtains only when the
corresponding universal proposition is objectively true, i.e.
when it is descriptive of a pattern of luiiversal hiiman behav-
ior. It is precisely this objective truth which the 'law of
nature' formulation invokes, and the maxim which is appre-
hended through such a universal law is strictly speaking one
which one is completely justified in acting upon.- On the :
:
other hand, if a universal proposition implies a contradic-
tion, then its negation is true, which means, at least, that
belief in the corresponding particular proposition is unjust-
ified, and, at most, that belief in its negation is compel-
led. This signifies, at least, that the maxim is to be re-
jected, and, at most, that its negation must be adopted.
To require that the proposition which constitutes a maxim
be universally believable is not to require that its object-
ive reality be evident to everybody. Rather, it is to re-
quire that no one can believe that its reality will prevent
the achievement of any of their own ends. This condition de-
mands respect for the ends of all rational beings, by
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requiring that all conative points of view on a given propos-
ed course of action he consulted. Following this require-
ment in the case of someone affected by an action, is treat-
ing them as an 'end in itself. Hence, if believability is
not universalizable
,
then one should abandon the belief that
the anticipated consequence of the proposed course of action
is desirable. This signifies that one should refrain from
this course of action.
To Schopenhauer, then, Kant's moral principle would con-
strain one to act only with complete justification. Hov; it
can and does constrain one to act this way, namely, hov/ his
moral law determines action, requires from Kant further ex-
planation. If this law can constrain action, then it is a
categorical imperative. When it does constrain action, then
who it constrains must take an interest in it, and voluntar-
ily submit to it.
In the first place, hov/ a law of reason can be a categor-
ical imperative is due to the dual nature of representations,
which distinguish human from mere animal motivation. As em-
pirical, they are in part products of the same sense organs
which are subject to the influence of potential stimuli,
stimuli which are influential only due to the absence of
stronger motivations. On the other hand, as rational, they
are in part produced by certain structural and combinatory
lav/s v/hich introduce ordering relations, such as ground and
consequence, that suggest an analogous ordering of the re-
spective motivational strengths of the objects of the ordered
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"beliefs. Ultimately, the rational aspect of motivational
representations is decisive, since it alone ensures the free-
dom from immediate sensi"ble influence which distinguishes hu-
man conation from other animal motivational processes.
Hence, Kant's moral lav/ is a categorical imperative, because
it is a law of reason which any believed proposition that de-
termines action, i.e. any maxim, is su"bject to, insofar as
such propositions are also su"bject to the laws of empirical
processes, which also contri"bute to their production.
This explains how a law of reason can influence behavior,
"but it is not sufficient as an explanation of how it does in-
fluence it. For, it does not explain why anyone would imcon-
ditionally submit their pursuits to such laws, as is requir-
ed by an imperative which is categorical. In the most obvi-
ous cases, the laws of reason are recognized as conatively
valid only to the extent that they abet the satisfaction of
personal desire, such as when the weight of a universal pro-
position like a hypothetical imperative promotes confidence
in the particular mode of pursuing happiness which it recom-
mends, or when it lends weight to the one of two coni dieting
beliefs which is apprehended through it. Nevertheless, there
are cases, Kant argues, where these laws are respected for
their ov/n sake, simply for what they express, as when a ra-
tional being respects epistemic laws simply for being deter-
minative of v/hat it means to be rational. The existence of
such cases is crucial for Kant, for they present the
possi-
bility of reason being obeyed for the sake of reason alone;
6?
'//hereby, insofar as obedience consists in the formulation of
an action-determining belief, reason is motivational of its
ovvTi accord, and pure practical reason is possible.
Now, Kant admits that it is impossible to explain how the
laws of reason can in the practical sphere be respected for
their ov/n sake, conceding that it is impossible to make
"comprehensible what interest man can take" in reason for
reason's sake. Schopenhauer, however, proposes that this in-
terest can be further explained, and, in fact, in two differ-
ent v/ays. The first is a development of a line of explana-
tion which Kant himself begins to follow, while the second is
an elaboration of a suspicion that Kant's formulations do
nothing to discourage. Both these explanations bear out, ac-
cording to Schopenhauer, that what appears to be reason's own
motivational power is in fact borrowed. Without the sources
which the categorical imperative borrows from, "it is
based
„22
on nothing, and so can support nothing and move nothing,
according to Schopenhauer.
Kant himself lays the grounds for a further
explanation of
v.'hy one might unconditionally subject oneself to the laws
of
reason. He traces this motive further to a
disposition to
cultivate an innate human "capacity for respect
for the moral
,,23
law as in itself a sufficient incentive of the
will.
Schopenhauer goes further and grounds this
disposition in a
"conception of the relation between one's ego and
an-
other's, that diminishes the empirical distinction
between
them. it is only such a conception, according
to
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Schopenhauer, that can found morality, and its appropriate
expression is "Injure no one; on the contrary, help everyone
as much as you can." In contrast, Kant's categorical im-
perative is perhaps useful as a means to overcoming egoism,
but only if the requisite disposition is present but still
latent. Once one achieves this self-knowledge, Kant's moral
law is as disposable as Wittgenstein's ladder after it has
been mounted. Y/hatever motivational pov/er reason might have
appeared to possess, in fact, belongs to that disposition.
The introduction of the concept of disposition generates
for Schopenhauer an entire theory of moral character and
freedom. Individual human characters are expressions of
one's disposition, and particular actions are necessitated by
character. V/hat could have been otherwise is primarily one's
character, not one's actions, but even character is determin-
ed by fate, according to Schopenhauer the fatalist. One can
at best seek useful knowledge for limited purposes, but not
unconditional freedom. But because the degree of distinction
between one's ego and another's can vary infinitely for var-
ious conceivers of that relation, human characters will range
over a wide spectrum of dispositions. At one end of the
spectrum, according to Schopenhauer, is the malicious egoist,
while at the other is one who is selflessly compassionate,
the paradigm of Schopenhauerian morality. Halfway between is
the prudentially just. Such dispositions are what constitute
moral character and intelligible selfhood for Schopenhauer,
and since, for example, the malicious egoist is an
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intelligible self, intelligible selfhood is not identical to
the part of each person which is common to all. How this
concept of the intelligible self compares to Kant's v/ill be
xurther examined below. In the meantime, it is becoming
clearer that the meaning of the categorical imperative will
in part depend on the moral disposition of the one who is
interpreting it.
Of particular interest to Schopenhauer is the prudentially
just type. This is the egoist who recognizes that universal
happiness is the best guarantee of personal happiness, and
interprets Kant's moral law as a prescription for universal
happiness. This character's respect for the moral law is at
the same time an egoism which "decides for justice and phil-
anthropy not because it desires to practice these virtues,
but because it wants to experience them," the price of
v/hich is that it also practice them. This is not the egoist
v;ho practices honesty in order to promote good business, but
is rather one who identifies them v/ithout reducing one to the
other. Here one is still fundamentally self-interested, but
reason for reason's sake best articulates this motivation.
This attitude might more accurately be described as a trust
in reason, but it is still a trust rooted in self-love.
Hence, the moral interest which Kant finds inexplicable can
also be explained as a form of egoism, according to Schopen-
hauer, from which reason's apparent motivational power is in
fact an investment.
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Schopenhauer on reason in the second Critique
Schopenhauer sees Kant in the Groundwork as progressing
from the formulation of the categorical imperative, to eji in-
sight into the commonality of different egos, to the verge of
a theory of moral disposition. In contrast, the second
Critique represents, for Schopenhauer, a regression that is
typical of Kant's later critical period. Rather than measure
27
morality by the paradigm of a "sympathetic disposition," '
which Schopenhauer sees the Groundwork approaching, Kant set-
pO
ties on the "form of universality" of maxims as the ground
of morality. Consequently, the centerpiece of his ethics in
the second Critique is a principle which expresses a lowest
common denominator paradigm of morality.
The categorical imperative is no longer a signpost to
metaphysical insight, but is now established and celebrated
as a "fact of reason. Virtue consists in the "unending
progress"^^ in the striving to make this a permanent fact.
•Since the establishment of this permanence is the sole uncon-
ditional object of "practical reason,"^ virtue is the su-
preme good of "rational finite beings."^ Hence, as Kant
seems to intend, this path to the attainment of the supreme
good is indifferent to the disposition of the rational being
who follows it. It is open to the prudent egoist and compas-
sionate saint alike. However, the stage of the path which
is not so clearly open to both types is that directed by the
32
judgement, "happiness is also required."
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Kant maintains that the latter is "judgement of an impar-
tial reason, hut here the question as to the disposition
of the possessor of this judgement becomes relevant. Scho-
penhauer argues that the sympathetic type possesses "the com-
plete self-effacement and denial of the will . . . which
alone gives that contentment that cannot again be disturb-
ed."-^ Kant adds the observation that such contentment "ne-
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cessarily accompanies the consciousness of virtue . But
then it would be out of character for a sympathetic type to
desire personal happiness in addition to virtue. Rather, it
could be the rationality of only an egoist of some degree
that would require personal happiness as an addition to vir-
tue. Hence, Schopenhauer concludes, Kant's highest good is
an object of egoism alone, and it, thus, stands as an expres-
sion of an element of eudaimonism- in Kant's ethics, an ele-
ment which prevails in this later version of his theory.
Intelligible world and intelligible selves
In thus marking more clearly the limits to the role of
reason in morality, Schopenhauer, as mentioned above, de-
velops a concept of moral character beyond Kant's. Moral
character is the expression of individual disposition, and
differs from individual to individual. The egoistic type is
as much a moral character as is the sympathetic type. Scho-
penhauer diverges from Kant when he identifies one's moral
character as one's intelligible self. He is, however, not
countering Kant's concept of the intelligible self as
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rational self, with a concept of the intelligible self as
willing self. Rather, he is denying that one's intelligible
self is the locus of what one has in common with other hu-
mans. For, the egoistic intelligible self, for example, is
one more
' disposed to the differentiation of the empirical
realm than to the unity of the in-itself.
Therefore, Schopenhauer is opposing Kant's identification
of the intelligible world as the realm which intelligible
selves constitute. Similarly, he denies that it comprises
any special moral sphere. The intelligible world is simply
the undifferentiated in-itself which is common to all. How
strongly the conception of it influences an individual indeed
bears upon the moral character of that individual, but so too
does this individual's accompanying conception of the empir-
ical world. Together, these two conceptions produce the in-
dividual's conception of the relation between egos which is
the metaphysical ground of moral character.
There are thus for Schopenhauer a plurality of moral
selves, which implies that for him the moral sphere is the
empirical. However, his concept of the moral sphere is not
so simple. Unlike -Kant, he holds that there are a plurality
of empirical worlds, each the realm of appearance for an in-
dividual self. The complexity that arises concerns the num-
ber of intelligible selves which appear in each empirical
world. This number will vary, depending on the moral charac-
ter of the one whose world it is. The more sympathetic type
is inclined to allow that there is more. than meets the eye in
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the appearance of other empirical selves, so the world that
appears to this type is likely to consist of perhaps as many
appearing intelligible selves as it does of empirical selves.
In contrast, only one intelligible self is likely to appear
in the world of the egoist. For Schopenhauer, the tradition-
al philosophical problem of the existence of other minds is
fundamentally a moral problem, as it seems to be for Kant
when he calls for the respect for others as ends in them- .
selves. Similarly, common pluralistic worlds can only be the
product of cooperative moral effort, and are not given or
discovered
.
Schopenhauer and Beck, Wood, and the utilitarian
Schopenhauer thus makes a distinctive contribution to the
controversy over the status of personal happiness in Kant's
ethics. He sees Kant moving towards a metaphysical philan-
thropism like his own, only to backslide into eudaimonism.
In what he takes to be the authentic Kantian ethics, the pur-
suit of personal happiness is always an obstacle to morality,
and is thus always antagonistic to it. Consequently, the
concept of the highest good which counts personal happiness
as a type of moral good, stands as a blatant and unfortunate
betrayal of true Kantianism, according to Schopenhauer.
This distinguishes him mildly from Beck, who concurs that
happiness is never a moral good and that the concept of the
highest good is a mistake for Kant, while denying that the
pursuit of happiness is always evil. Despite the slightness
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of this distinction, it actually cuts quite deeply, reaching
to an obscurity at the heart of Kant's ethics. Beck argues
that the pursuit of happiness is neither good nor evil when
the maxim that is acted upon is "a principle which is not op-
posed to the legislation of reason, and then it is a legal
and sometimes a prudential will"-^ which has adopted it.
When Kant refers to the possessor of such a will as a "man of
good morals, who is yet not a morally good man, he seems
to be endorsing the possibility of moral neutrality. Hovf-
O O
ever, Kant also allows that "lawfully good"-^ conduct can be
that of someone with a morally evil disposition, thereby
suggesting that legality is not neutral with respect to moral
good and evil, but rather is irrelevant. Kant seems unde-
cided here, so neither Schopenhauer nor Beck seem to be
staking a decisive claim with respect to the question of the
possibility of moral neutrality in his ethics. A further
manifestation of this point of difference, is Schopenhauer s
criticism of maxim- formulating activity as fundamentally ego-
istical and immoral, in contrast with Beck's continued en-
dorsement of it as a neutral but fundamental feature of
Kant's ethics, despite the utilitarianism to which such en-
dorsement seems to expose him.
To Wood, on the other hand, Schopenhauer's position re-
presents a much more direct challenge, for he is concerned to
defend the results of the second Critique against charges of
eudaimonism. In the process, he takes particular note of
Schopenhauer's charge, and offers a response to it. He takes
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Schopenhauer to he arguing that just or philanthropic action,
dictated by the moral law, which produces general benefits
that include a promotion of the welfare of the agent, is ul-
timately egoistic, and reason enters into its motivation only
instrumentally . V/ood's response is that Schopenhauer's is
not the only diagnosis of the agent's motives here, for Kant
is claiming that it is possible for the agent that "pure
reason of itself can be practical, and can motivate the will
without any consideration whatever of the consequences of
one's actions. Wood, however, is clearly imderestimating
the scope of Schopenhauer's position, which recognizes Kant’s
tendencies toward a philanthropism. Regardless, this re-
sponse here fails to address Schopenhauer's main point that
rationality in the service of egoism alone is what takes into
consideration the consequences of action with respect to
one's hapniness. V/ood never explains why contentment might
not quell the desires of a virtuous compassionate v.dll, in
which case the further desire for happiness must be regarded
as egoistic, even if rational.
Along the same lines, Schopenhauer's position is also a
challenge to the utilitarian, for whom Kant's highest good
amounts to a universal happiness which includes the personal
haopiness that Kant's concept unnecessarily takes special
note of. Schopenhauer, though, is arguing that this special
note is the decisive feature, since it indicates the ultimate
eudaimonistic underpinnings of this concept. This implies
that if Kant is in fact utilitarian here, it is only
because
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universal happiness is a means to personal happiness, and
utilitarians are ultimately eudaimonistic
. Excluding person-
al happiness from the highest good, and more generally empha-
sizing the philanthropic side of Kant's ethics, would seem to
rescue him from utilitarianism, since it would lead to the
position that less general happiness is morally more desir-
able .
Still, it is not clear that such a rescue is entirely suc-
cessful, since the utilitarian has a response of sorts to
Schopenhauer. Mill points out, first, that self-contentment
40is at least a "prevention or mitigation of unhappiness,"
which is consistent with utilitarian aims. Secondly, he
urges that self-sacrifice is always for some further end,
4l . .
namely, for "the happiness of others," which is also con-
sistent with utilitarianism. Philanthropism is therefore
utilitarianism, in which case Schopenhauer has not quite res-
cued Kant from utilitarianism. At best, he can only deliver
him to eudaimonism.
Conclusion
Schopenhauer's claim that Kant's highest good is a eudai-
monistic regression is thus defensible in response to pos-
sible objections from Beck and Wood. Less certain is the
success of his efforts to extricate Kant from utilitarianism,
in the process of which he finds himself, too, entangled with
it. Connected with this difficulty is the less comical
problem of how morality is at all possible for him, once
77
a neutral factor like rationality is no longer acceptable
as a measure of moral worth.
The interrelation of these problems, which remain unsolved
by Schopenhauer, serves as the point of departure for Nietz-
sche's criticism of him. Nietzsche furthermore traces these
problems to aspects of Kant's theory which do not occur to
Schopenhauer. In the next chapter, I will discuss how Nietz-
sche thereby interprets Kant's ethics, and the criticism
which his interpetation implies.
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CHAPTER 3
REASON AND RESSENTIMENT IN KANT’S ETHICS
Introduction
To summarize the previous chapters, the concept of the
highest good stands as a problematic and controversial fea-
ture of Kant's ethics. It is problematic because one of its
constituents, personal happiness, is an empirically condi-
tioned concept, whereas Kant maintains that the highest good
is a pure practical concept. If it cannot be explained how
the highest good of this ethics can both include personal
happiness and yet remain empirically unconditioned
,
then
either the concept in question does not qualify as the high-
est good of pure practical reason, or else Kant's ethics is
empirically conditioned.
As I have discussed. Wood, Beck, Schopenhauer, and utili-
tarianism suggest four different approaches to resolving this
problem. Wood defends the concept, arguing that personal
happiness can be regarded as being logically included in the
effects of pure practical reason, without being present as an
empirically conditioned motive. Beck denies that it is a
pure practical concept, arguing that it is derived from the
theoretical concept of a self-rewarding morality, in which
personal happiness has a neutral moral status. Schopenhauer
maintains that Kant's is an empirically conditioned ethics,
the subtle eudaimonism of which becomes blatant once personal
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happiness is identified as a good. Finally, utilitarianism
defends the concept, arguing that it articulates what is im-
plicit in the fimdamental principles of Kant's ethics all
along, namely that universal happiness is the highest good,
and that personal happiness is singled out by Kant for mere-
ly methodological reasons.
Furthermore, I have also discussed a main objection to
each position, as implied by one of the other three. Accord-
ing to Beck, Wood fails to account for the relation of pro-
portionality which is essential to Kant's concept. Accord-
"to utilitarianism. Beck fails to acknowledge that Kant's
moral law is, to begin with, a formula for the harmonization
of personal happinesses. According to Schopenhauer, utili-
is latent eudaimonism and, hence, at odds with the
non-selfish intent of Kant's position. According to Wood,
Schopenhauer fails to appreciate how personal happiness can
be a rational end without being an empirical object of de-
sire, to which the utilitarian adds that Schopenhauerian eth-
ics of compassion is itself one form of utilitarianism.
In this chapter, I will present an alternative approach to
Kant's problem, one derived from Nietzschean premises. How
this approach is distinguished from the others will become
apparent as it is presented, and I will reserve a fuller dis-
cussion of its distinctiveness for the next chapter. Here, I
will argue that from a Nietzschean point of view, the concept
of the highest good compromises Kant's ethics and should be
discarded. My argument will be based on Nietzsche's
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distinction between 'master' morality and 'slave' morality,
and will try to shov/ that while Kant's fundamental law of
pure practical reason is an expression of the former, his
concept of the highest good is an expression of the latter.
Since Nietzsche affirms master morality and rejects slave mo-
rality, this argument will conclude that Kant goes astray
with his highest good. This conclusion will, in turn, point
to a more general criticism of Kant's ethics, along lines
that are usually vaguely recognized by commentators, but that
are more often than not subsequently blurred.
Virtue, happiness, and the best world
Before turning to Nietzsche, one facet of Kant’s highest
good needs to be explored a little further. It concerns a
confusion that comes to light in Beck's argiment against
V/ood, and which needs to be clarified. As it turns out, this
surface confusion covers two deeper issues that can perhaps
pose serious problems for Kant.
As has been seen. Beck maintains that Wood fails to ex-
plain hov/ the highest good is constituted by the relation-
ship of proportionality betv/een virtue' and happiness, which
Kant himself regards as requisite to it. But Wood is not
guilty of misrepresentation here, for it is indeed Kant who
encourages confusion by employing four distinct concepts to
construct the highest good, while speaking as if it v/ere only
two which were susceptible to being conflated. The two with
which he is apparently concerned are the supreme good, i.e.
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virtue, and the highest good.
i.e. virtue oombined with hap-
piness. But four distinct concepts
are at issue here-, vir-
tue. virtue complemented by happiness,
happiness proportion-
ate to virtue, and ’the best
world’, governed by such a law
of proportionality. Wood is
Indeed not misrepresenting Kant
by associating the highest good
with the complementarity ver-
sion of the relation between virtue
and happiness, but this
version is clearly not the definitive
version. For. it fails
to account for the conditionality
ordering which Kant means
to hold between the two. Hence,
the concept of complement-
arity is of only secondary Interest
here, and Wood’s posi-
tion is thereby perhaps the
weakest of those discussed.
It is thus the relation of
proportionality which is
sential to Kant’s highest good.
Hence, what the latter com-
bines is not so much virtue and
happiness, but rather virtue
and the best world, as Beck
argues. With this clarified.
+ ...va qtatus of virtue as the supreme
though, doubt IS cast on the
s i
good. To begin with, the concept
of the best world, as con-
tributing its law of proportionality
to the concept of the
highest good, seems to be at least
as important to the latter
as virtue is. unlike happiness
in its subordinate role.
Even
more to the point. Kant gives
every indication that he re-
wards unrewarded virtue as a less
rational state of affairs
than if therein partial vice
receives due punishment, because
the latter (partial virtue plus
proportionality fully m ef-
fect) is more completely rational
than the former (full vir-
tue plus random distribution of
happiness). If co. then
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living in the best world is more supreme than possessing vir-
tue. It is unclear if Kant is aware of this potential chal-
lenge, but it is clear that an inadequate response v'ould
leave his highest good in serious jeopardy.
The concept of the best world poses a further problem, one
with Leibnizian overtones. One v/ay to articulate this pro-
blem is with the following line of argumentation: Deserved
happiness is a significant concept only if it is distinct
from the concept of happiness unqualified by considerations
of merit. Now, as Kant argues, the possibility of deserved-
ness requires reason to postulate the existence of an omni-
potent rational being who has the power to actualize the dis-
tribution of happiness which reason dictates. Since this be-
ing will never fail to distribute happiness in proportion to
virtue, as reason dictates, happiness, not to mention unhap-
piness and every degree in between, is in all cases deserved.
But then the concept of deserved happiness is indistinct from
that of happiness, and, so, is trivial. The point is that
Kant gives every indication of wanting to deny that the ac-
tual is indeed the best world, yet the logic of his position
seems to require that he do not deny it. Hov/ever he might
v/ant to resolve this, here is another deep issue which lies
just beneath the surface of his concept of the highest good.
Nietzsche on reason and Kant’s best world
These suggested difficulties with this concept of a best
world are, as stands, not conclusive as criticisms of the
85
of the highest good. Nor is Beck's point that such a concept
is not a product of pure practical reason and, so, is ines-
sential to v;hat reason requires of conduct. For, as the
utilitarian argues, if the moral law is recognized as a uni-
versal command of reason, then the effect of pure cractical
reason would be what would be realized by universal obedience
to this command, namely, a best v/orld of self-rewarding mo-
rality. Beck's dismissal of the latter from the practical
realm thus rests on his questionable reading of the moral lav/
as a command to merely an individual.
A different understanding of Kant's best v/orld is proposed
by Nietzsche, and, as indicated above, the elaboration of his
understanding is one of the central aims of this chapter and
of this work as a whole. An introduction to the approach he
takes is part of an observation he makes in Daybreak . This
observation concerns a conflict between morality and criti-
cism: "To criticise morality itself, to regard morality as
a problem . . . has that not been— is that not—immoral?
—
But morality does not merely have at its command every kind
of means of frightening off critical hands, it succeeds . . .
in paralysing the critical will and even in enticing it over
to its OYm side; there are even cases in which morality has
been able to turn the critical will against itself."^ As he
continues, he makes it clear that he regards Kant as a prime
example of a thinker whose critical v/ill is paralyzed and
turned against itself by morality.
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More specifically, it is the status of the best world
which Nietzsche sees as at stake in the conflict between mo-
rality and criticism in Kant's philosophy. As he diagnoses
Kant's critical project: "To create room for his 'moral
realm' he saw himself obliged to posit an undemonstrable
'.’orld, a logical 'Beyond' —it was for precisely that that he
had need of his critique of pure reasoni In other v'ords: he
',,'ould not have had need of it if one thing had not been more
vital to him than anything else: to render the 'moral realm'
unassailable, even better incomprehensible to reason--for he
felt that a moral order of things was only too assailable by
,
..2
reasoni
It is thus Nietzsche's position that Kant's best world is
antagonistic to reason, which could seem to imply that he re-
jects Kant's highest good on the same grounds. It should be
noted that these observations of Nietzsche's tell strongly
against one traditional conception of Nietzsche as a misolog-
ist. To the contrary, here he is championing reason, perhaps
more so than even Kant. At least, he seems to agree with the
latter that "it is pure reason itself which contains the stan-
dard for the critical investigation of its entire use." On
the other hand, he seems to disagree that pure reason is the
source of morality, which, would seem to imply that he is at
odds with Kant's demonstration in the Groundwork that it is
such a source. The latter conclusion is perhaps true, except
that it perpetuates a prior ambiguity. That is, whether or
not Nietzsche is at odds with the Groundwork depends on
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'whethGr or noi; he indeed denies that pure reason is "the
source of morality, v/hich in turn depends on v/hat is meant
here by 'morality'
. The latter question is not mere semant-
ical nitpicking, for it is a central contention of Nietz-
sche's philosophy that there are two quite distinct types of
morality, 'master' morality and 'slave' morality. As will be
argued, it is on this distinction that Nietzsche's approach
turns
.
Nietzsche's Genealogy and Kant’s Groundwork
On the Genealogy of Moral s contains Nietzsche's most con-
centrated and sustained discussion of master morality and
slave morality, and it will be this discussion which will
supply the grounds for developing Nietzsche's approach to the
Kantian issues in question. Before I proceed, some prepara-
tory remarks may be in order. The Genealogy may be widely
recognized as a major source of Nietzsche's views on moral-
ity, but it is less well established as a commentary or cri-
ticism of Kant. One exception is Deleuze, who, in Nietzsche
and Philosophy
,
reads the Genealogy as a commentary on the
'Transcendental Dialectic', correlating Nietzsche's ressenti -
ment
,
bad conscience, and ascetic ideal, with Kant's paralog-
ism, antinomy, and .'ideal. This reading inspires what fol-
lows, except that I identify Nietzsche's target as the
Groundwork
,
and the correlate of the ascetic ideal as the in-
telligible world of the latter work.
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Appreciating this correlation can he helped hy noticing
the parallel between the titles On the Genealogy of Morals
and Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Of course, both
suggest a treatment of morality, but the key contrast is be-
tween the concept of a genealogy and that of a groundwork of
a metaphysic. Both connote a sense of basis, but the former
does so in association with connotations of natural and tem-
poral succession, while the latter suggests artificial and a-
temporal construction. No one who respects Nietzsche as a
very creative and careful writer can easily dismiss these con-
trasts as coincidental.
There is admittedly little in the Genealogy which might
G'ua.lify in traditional terms as a self-description as a com-
mentary on Kant. Nevertheless, traditional writing technique
is not Nietzsche's style, while on the other hand, Kantian
thought figures in some of the key passages of this work.
For example, in his Preface, Nietzsche first calls to mind an
anti-Kantianism on the question of the origin of evil which
he had held earlier in his career, only to subsequently up-
date himself as siding with Kant against Schopenhauer -
on pity. These remarks may suggest a new-found commonality
with Kant, after years of viewing the latter through Schopen-
hauer's eyes, his greatest early influence.
There are similar interesting refernces to Kant throughout
the main body of the text. Now little could be more trivial
in philosophy than the fact that two different works both
have three chapters, but the common subject matter of their
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Pe=t.ve chapter. Paiaea PMa Pact i„ case of t,e
PPP the Grajmd^
triviality
-- t.e iiPst capter „i t.e latter, tPat cl t.e icr„r ireonoerned with the ^eaaipg d .gp„,,
, ^
evea s an atte.pt by Hietcsche to derive a eoncept of winO which 'good' might apply. Nietzschp'eoiNietzsche s second chapter,
e Kant s, discusses the role >-xn oi reason m human behavior
makes reference to Kant'<p ^3+ •
'
* t s categorical imperative, defines au-ono.y, and presents the practice of pro.ising as a relevant
example. Finally, both third chapters attempt to derive a
concept of a supernatural realitv • *y. Such points of compari-
son are certainly not trivial.
»hat this contrast amoiaits to is not one of my present
concerns, especially insofar as what I argne below does nothang on a decisive establishing of the Genealogy as a deli-
herate commentary on the G^d^. „ most, these remar.ts
have been designed to promote the plausibility of applying
htetssche-s concepts to the relevant Kantian problems. La-
in the next chapter. I will respond to some challenges
plausibility. For now, before explaining the pro-
posed application of his concepts, a further discussion of
Kant's critical philosophy is necessary.
f
ReasoTL-aji^c^ru^ in Kanfc
^ Nietzsche's account of the conflict between morality and
criticism in Kant's philosophy points to the need to careful-
ly isolate its critical principles from certain moral
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presuppositions. Furthermore, since Kant contends that the
basis of those principles is reason itself, it too v/ill be
stripped of those presuppositions. As a result, reason and
its critical function should come clearly to light. Despite
the fairly constant conjunction of reason and morality in
the relevant rexts, the task of disjunction is surprisingly
simple and straightforward.
The starting point is Kant's definition of pure reason:
"A pure concept of reason can in general be explained by the
concept of the unconditioned, conceived as containing a
k . .
ground of the synthesis of the conditioned." This is a pow-
erful definition, since it presents the basic features of all
the important functions of reason. The connection of the con-
cept of the unconditioned to the concept of the conditioned
which the definition contains "is obviously synthetic."^
Here, then, the important concept of synthesis is presented
in its purest and most original lorm, because synthesis is
the combination of heterogeneous elements, and nothing in
Kant's system exemplifies heterogeneity more than the uncon-
ditioned and the conditioned. The definition also suggests
the logical employment of reason, wherein synthesis emerges
as syllogistic inference.
On the other hand, the heterogeneity of unconditioned and
conditioned must be preserved. Because reason is the very
source of this distinction, it alone is capable of drawing
it. It is reason when it draws and attempts to preserve
this
distinction that it is carrying out its critical function.
91
That this is the nature of its critical
function is seen
clearly in each of the Critiques . In each,
Kant resolves a
dialectical dilemma by uncovering a confusion of a
condition-
ed representation with an unconditioned
one, e.g. treating an
appearance as absolute reality. In this
function, reason .
supplies a standard, namely, that the
unconditioned and the
conditioned are distinct, and is, thus,
capable of making a
judgement as well as a correction on the basis of
this stan-
dard. In one context he calls this
its "highest function."
Hence, whenever a distinction between
the unconditioned
and the conditioned is drawn, reason
is performing
tical function. Now, one case in
which it operates in this
v,-ay is quite important to Kant.
This is when "the empirical-
ly conditioned use of reason . . .
presumes to be sove-
reign, that is, when empirically
conditioned reason pre-^^^
sumes "to be the only ground of
determination of the will."
This use of reason presumes, in
other words, to be an uncon-
ditional ground of determination of
the will, but it cannot
be. For, first, everything
empirical is conditioned, so, no
empirical condition can qualify as
unconditioned. Second, it
is not the only ground of
determination of the will, since
.He concept of universal law
can further determine the
will,
and the latter indeed qualifies
as a concept of the uncondi-
tioned. Reason is thus doing
nothing more than performing
its critical function here,
and why this is such an
important
ease to Kant should be clear
from the analysis. Here,
reason
is more specifically pure
practical reason, and the rule
oi
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its application to this kind of case is indeed the Fundament-
al Law of Pure Practical Reason. By means of this law, the
conditioned adoption of a maxim v/hich presumes to uncondi-
tionality, is exposed through a comparison with true uncondi-
tionality. In the process, as in all its critical acts, rea-
son judges and attempts to correct the confusion of the con-
ditioned with the unconditionec on the basis of its ovm stan-
dard.
How the empirically conditioned use of reason might be-
come so presumptuous is contained in the original definition
of reason. It should be carefully noted that the definition
involves tv;o different syntheses. First, there is the syn-
thesis which has been the focus of the foregoing discussion,
namely, that of the unconditioned and the conditioned. But
second, it also -involves the synthesis of the manifold of the
conditioned, a synthesis the ground of which is the first
synthesis. It is reason in the context of effecting this se-
cond synthesis which is an empirically conditioned use, and
in the absence of the first synthesis, it could presume it-
self to be sovereign. But the possibility of the presence
of
that first exposes the second to criticism, when the
latter
tries to deny that possibility, and, furthermore, establishes
a further condition for that empirical use. As a result,
three further concepts can be rudimentally defined.
First,
the criticism in question here is nothing but the seli-cri-
tique of reason. Second, insofar as one synthesis is
the
ground of the other, where both are products of reason,
here
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is the concept of the autonomy of reason in its barest form.
Likewise, the merely empirically conditioned use of reason
explained here, is the heteronomy of reason. Hence, these,
too, are all implicit in that original definition, though
Kant never seems to make a point of tracing them back to
this root.
Finally
,
one manifold of the conditioned which reason syn-
thesizes is the manifold of inclination. The resultant to-
tality is the concept of happiness, and reason is here more
specifically 'practical' reason. Since "will is nothing but
practical reason,"^ here also is a preliminary definition of
will. The principle of any such synthesis is what Kant calls
a maxim. And, as already pointed out, when reason supplies
this use of reason with a further condition, it is function-
ing as pure practical reason, and such determination of rea-
son is also describable as autonomy of v/ill.
Therefore, as Nietzsche implies, reason and criticism are
conceivable in Kant's philosophy without reference to the
moral presuppositions with which they are usually found, in
his texts, to be conjoined. The key points are that reason
alone is the standard, of his critiques of reason, and that a
fundamental law of pure practical reason does not need to be
known as a 'm.ora]. ' law. How morality is involved -''ith Kant-
ian reason is a relation which the Genealogy can help demon-
strate .
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Master raorali'^, slave morality, and ressentiment
By suggesting, as seen above in Daybreak
,
that icriticism
oj. morality is immoral, Nietzsche seems to imply that he is
an ' immoralist '
. But such self-description is either ironic
or provisional if such criticism is of only a kind of moral-
ity in the name of another kind of morality. Based on the
Genealogy
,
the latter would seem to be the case. For, in
the first essay of that work, he considers the possibility
of a variety of forms of morality.
On one level, that first essay is an inquiry into the na-
ture of morality not unlike those conducted by several other
prominent modern philosophers. Like Hume, Kant, Schopen-
hauer, and Mill, among others, Nietzsche recognizes that the
central issue -in morality is the conflict between the inter-
ests of the individual and those of the collective. Further-
more, like them, his methodology involves an attempt to set
a definition of value terms like 'good'.
However, the similarity ends there, because Nietzsche re-
volutionizes that kind of inquiry. First, he does not take
for granted, as apparently do most others, the primacy of
collective values, in contrast with '.vhich individual values
are somehow faulty and in need of adjustment, the explanation
of which becomes the central moral theme in such inquiries.
Second, he rejects the usual assumption that the appropriate
standard is the standpoint of the passive recipient or ob-
server of action, as opposed to that of the agent. If pas-
sivity is taken as a measure of value, then any definition of
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'good' which expresses this standpoint will include an af-
firmation of passivity. Instead, Nietzsche's inquiry is con-
ducted from the opposite of the usual point of viev;, namely,
as an affirmation of some version of individualism and activ-
ity, over and against the values of a certain version of col-
lective passivism. It should be briefly noted that no neu-
tral middle ground is acceptible to Nietzsche here, since
neutrality is merely another manifestation of passivity. The
value system which he affirms here he frequently designates
as 'master' morality, in contrast with the corresponding de-
signation, 'slave' morality, which he applies to the opposing
set of values.
Synonymous with 'master' in many contexts is 'noble', and
to these he often opposes 'base', or 'herd', as synonyms for
'slave'. 'Noble', 'base', and 'herd' evoke for Nietzsche an
historical contrast betv/een Greek values and Christian val-
ues, and are perhaps less offensive than 'master' and
'slave'. But offensiveness aside, the latter terms resonate
v.'ith their ovn significance. First, the evoke Hegel's so-
called 'Master-Slave Dialectic' which is resolved in a manner
which is probably unacceptable to Nietzsche. Second, that
offensiveness can be appropriate v/hen the terms are used to
distinguish those who can think for themselves from those v'ho
cannot. Finally, with particular regard to Kant, the synony-
mity betv/een 'master' and 'autonomous', and betv/een 'slave'
and ' heteronomous ' , are worth noting.
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On the "basis of his affirmation of the 'master' perspec-
tive, Nietzsche proceeds to present what is usually present-
ed from the opposite perspective, namely, an explanation of
the faultiness of the opposite. This explanation, however,
is not supplied by the provisional characterization of the
one side as individual and active, and the other as collec-
tivistic and passive. In fact, to a certain degree, these
features are inessential to the thrust of his criticism, io
the contrary, certain points of similarity are more essential
to it than s.re those features.
As value systems, both contain an order of rank, that is,
both affirm some things and deny others, with what is
affirm-
ed serving as the standard for each. Furthermore,
both types
are humanmade , historically contingent cultural producus.
Hence, it is Nietzsche's view that there are no divinely
given, eternally valid moral values, contrary to the
claims
of some. Much of the first essay of the Genealogy
is devot-
ed to defending this view, despite the presence
in the essay
of a feature which seems to suggest that Nietzsche
himself is
implying the contrary.
Though both sides both affirm and deny,
Nietzsche takes
the trouble to distinguish the expressions
of affirmation and
denial of one side from those of the other.
'Master' affirm-
ation and denial is expressed as 'good' and
'bad', while
'slave' affirmation and denial is expressed
as 'good' and
'evil'. The title of the essay, "'Good and
Evil
,
Good and
'Bad'", does nothing to discourage the
suspicion that
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Nietzsche's purpose here is to oppose one set of eternal val-
ues, Good and Evil, with another. Good and Bad, in blatant
violation of his stated viev; of the nature of moral values.
Hov/ever, it is hard to accept this assessment of his pur-
poses, especially since the introduction of these labels in-
to the discussion seems to serve at least four other pur-
poses. First, as suggested earlier, it invokes the standard
methodology of moral inquiry of attempting to define moral
terms, as a prepa,ration for revolutionizing it. Second, it
establishes a direct reference to the work which precedes the
Genealogy
,
Beyond Good and Evil , thereby paving the way for
him to make it clear that "at least this does not mean 'Be-
yond Good and Bad.'"^° The latter assertion confirms the
claim that Nietzsche's rejection of slave morality is not
tantamount to a rejection of all morality. Third, it makes
a terminological point, the significance of which will be
discussed further belov/.
The fourth purpose is to intimate v/herein lies the essen-
tial distinction between master and slave moralities. The
difference of the negatives, 'bad' and 'evil', where none ap-
parently obtains between the positives, points oO uhese as
containing the key feature. Now, it should be obvious that
they have something in comraon over and above mere negativity.
That is, since the two systems which they represent oppose
one another, what is denied in one is affirmed in the other.
Collective passivism is 'bad', individualistic activism is
'evil' . However, Nietzsche means even more with them.
98
For master morality, 'bad' is an expression of contemp-
tuous condescension, which .it "employs to distinguish the
lower orders from itself. To nobility, the base are com-
mon, plain, and despicably impotent, so it wants to distance
itself from them. In contrast, according to Nietzsche, for
slave morality, 'evil' is an expression of a peculiar com-
bination of hate, envy, and vengefulness for which he coins
the term ' ressentiment '
. Ressentiment is a "vengeful cun-
12ning of impotence" which introduces an "inculpatory impli-
13 .cation" into negative moral values. The target of such im-
plication is the strong, because of the strength which they,
but not slaves, possess. Thus, unlike 'bad', which is used
to distance, 'evil' means to level and assimilate: it is a
"demand of strength that it should not express itself as
14
strength." At the philosophical level, this demand is
frequently articulated as the positing of "a neutral sub-
stratum behind the strong man."^' Nietzsche cites as an ex-
ample of such a neutral substratum "the Kantian 'thing-in-
itself, ' " and this will be further discussed below. More
ambitiously, ressentiment creates grand fantasies of "ima-
17ginary revenge," ' such as the afterworldly realms where the
good are rewarded and the evil are punished, which are the
staple of many religious doctrines.
Few of Nietzsche's philosophical positions are more clear-
ly articulated or more consistently sustained than his con-
demnation of ressentiment. As the basis of slave morality.
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it is the target of his criticism of the latter. L-ikev.dse,
it is most notably the concepts of culpability, neutralisa-
tion, and the afterv/orldly that tend to distinguish slave
from master morality. How this distinction pertains to
Kant's ethics v/ill become clearer after a discussion of the
second important topic in the Genealogy .
Bad conscience and guilt
The title of the second essay of the Genealogy is
"'Guilt', 'Bad Conscience', and the Like", and ignoring the
results of the first essay can lead to missing the entire
point of the second. As seen, Nietzsche takes a great deal
of trouble to distinguish 'bad' from 'evil', and for several
reasons. Immediately follov/ing, the term 'bad' appears in
the title of the very next discussion. If 'guilt' is re-
garded as meaning 'consciousness of evil in oneself, as it
often is, then surely Nietzsche cannot be taking 'bad con-
science’ and 'guilt' to be synonyms here'. The other afore-
mentioned purpose served in opposing 'bad' to 'evil' is to
fix the terminology for the subsequent discussion, and not,
of course, to provide these vdth eternally valid definitions,
as some seem to suspect of Nietzsche. A careful reading of
this second essay reveals that Nietzsche in one way or an-
other distinguishes every occurrence of the term 'bad-' from
the use of those who mean it as substitutable for evil. To
miss this is to run into the difficulty what Deleuze, for ex-
ample, does not seem to resolve, namely, the conflict betv/een
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his "had conscience extends ressentinient
. and Nietzsche's
"the origin of bad conscience
. .
.
precluded
. . . even all
ressentiment
.
What Nietzsche is trying to demonstrate in this essay is
that bad conscience and guilt are two different phenomena,
but that the former can easily develop into the latter. Kis
polemical stance here is the sane as it is in the first es-
say, because the battle lines are exactly the same. V/hat he
is opposing is a concept of guilt that is taken for granted
becaiise the point of view which it represents is so firmly
interv;oven into the fabric of the society he lives in, and
which, in fact, could be said to constitute that entire fab-
ric. That conception of guilt remains familiar a century
later. It is based on the assi,unption that the value system
v/hich Nietzsche associates with slave morality, i.e. that
collective values are good and egoism which opposes then is
evil, is an eternally true system. As a consequence, guilt
is the presence of evil, and guilt is one's av/areness .of
this presence in oneself. There are two ways that guilt can
arise, either through the performance of evil deeds, or, more
extremely, as an inherent characteristic, e.g. the doctrine
of original sin.
Clearly, such a conception depends on the validity of the
V0,lue system it is based upon, a validity which Nietzsche
disputes. The criticism of slave morality thus prepares
Nietzsche to develop an alternative explanation of guilt,
though, as he acknowledges, he is not the first modern
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philosopher to do so. Before him, Spinoza, who also rejects
some of the main tenets of slave morality, suggests an alter-
native. Spinoza holds that guilty conscience is essentially
the pain of disappointment that gets misunderstood. Nietz-
sche agrees with the general thrust of Spinoza's diagnosis,
but carries it one crucial step further.
In Spinoza's account, the pain of disappointment is ex-
plained as a passive experience, i.e. it is the effect of the
absence of some external object the anticipated presence of
which had been serving as a source of pleasure, with that ab-
sence being beyond the control of the sufferer in question.
Nietzsche, on the other hand, traces guilt to an actively in-
duced state of pain, a psychological configuration which he
terms 'bad conscience'. This state arises when human aggres-
sive "instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly
20
turn inward . . . outward charge was inhibited." He iden-
tifies two different causes of inhibition. First, there
might be "those fearful bulwarks with which the political or-
ganization protected itself against the old instincts of
freedom--punishment being among these." Second, and equal-
ly inhibitive, is the "lack of external enemies and resis-
tances."^^ Both these kinds of social condition can be a
ore-condition for internalized aggression, and Nietzsche
makes it clear that he believes that one or the other of
these has been the rule of human civilization for at least
tv/o and a half millennia.
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But this internalized aggression is not a blind and de-
structive force; it is rather "the instinct for freedom (in
my language: the will to power). As Nietzsche explains
his concept of will to power in this context, it is an ac-
tive, creative, and artistic drive, a "secret self-ravish-
ment, this artists' cruelty, this delight in imposing upon
oneself as a hard, recalcitrant, suffering material and in
burning a will, a critique, a contradiction, a contempt, a
24 ...
No into it." In other words, bad conscience is a judge-
ment of self-dissatisfaction, a judgement made by strength
about the impotence of inhibition. As a point of anticipa-
tion here, the reference to 'critique' is significant if it
is recognized that reason is a form of strength. In turn,
this judgement is preparation for subsequent development
and cultivation, for bad conscience, as "the womb of a.11
ideal and imaginative phenomena, also brought to light an
abundance of strange new beauty and affirmation." That is,
it is prepatory to making oneself 'good', namely, v/orthy of
affirmation by strength. If it is not already clear, later
it will be explained which feature or features of Kant's
philosophy could be regarded as examples of bad conscience.
The point of insisting that bad conscience is a product of
strength, albeit in a peculiar configuration, is to establish
it in independence from any of slave morality' s presupposi-
tions. This prepares Nietzsche to further establish it as a
phenomenon which is not only distinct from guilt, but which
is indeed the precondition of the latter phenomenon. Guilt
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is a distortion of bad conscience, which becomes possible be-
cause of the susceptibility of the latter in its incipient
stages to the poison of ressentiment
. Slave morality thus
gains purchase, targeting the aggressive instincts themselves
as the source of the unsatisfactoriness of the state of inhi-
bition, thereby marking them, and not either the state of
weakness or the inhibitory forces, as the undesirable factor
in the condition. As a result, bad conscience is transformed
into guilt.
It is only in the process of this appropriation of bad
conscience by the forces of ressentiment , that guilt first
becomes a psychological phenomenon. Prior to this '^pushing
back into the conscience," guilt belongs only to the sphere
of "the contractual relationship between creditor and debt-
or, along with the concepts of duty and obligation. It is
one instance in particular of a contractual relationship that
is relevant to Nietzsche's interests here, a social formation
which is not usually understood as a contractual relation. A
more familiar instance is the relation which holds bet'-/een
individual and state, so that the expression 'debt to socie-
ty' is not meaningless. Along the same lines, religion, ac-
cording to Nietzsche, is also fundamentally contractual, even
if the expression 'debt to the tribal ancestors' makes little
sense in modern V/estern civilization.
Nietzsche contends that "within the original tribal com-
munity . . . the living generation always recognized a juri-
dical duty toward earlier generations, and especially toward
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the earliest, v/hich founded the trihe.''^® Whatever the
grounds for this contention might be, it is no more hypothet-
ical than the more widely accepted explanation of the origin
of religion, the premises of which Nietzsche, for one, does
not accept. In any case, as he proceeds to explain, as the
strength and influence of the tribe continues to increase,
the memory of the ancestors is "bound to grow to monstrous
dimensions through the imagination of grov.dng fear and to
recede into the darkness of the divinely uncanny and unima-
ginable: in the end the ancestor must necessarily be trans-
figured into a god. "29 At the same time, the guilty feeling
of indebtedness continues to grow to monstrous proportions,
so that the advent of the Christian God, as the maximum god
attained so far, v/as therefore accompanied by the maximum
feeling of guilty indebtedness on earth, and orovides the
most familiar conception of religion.
It thus becomes clear how the tribe can secure permanent
power: by ensuring the impossibility of escaping or repaying
this indebtedness. It tries to accomplish this through the
"moralization of the concepts guilt and duty, their being
pushed back into into the bad conscience
,
v/hich is vulner-
able in its impotence. As mentioned, the target of this push
is neither the weakenss nor the inhibitory forces, but, rath-
er, the inhibited animal instincts, so that the sufferer "re-
interprets these animal instincts themselves as a form of
32guilt before God," the ultimate antithesis of those in-
stincts. Corporeal existence itself implies guilt, as does
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animal self-interest, whereas self-denial is a duty and obli-
gation. These concepts emerge moralized: the instinctual
exercise of strength is 'evil', and requires punishment,
just like any breach of contract. And if punishment is not
meted out in this world, it will surely be in the next. But
the instinct to self-cultivation is intrinsic to the dynamic
of bad conscience, so with power of this instinct under the
control of this particular value system, the 'good' which it
aims at is unselfishness, freedom from the animal instincts,
and the promotion of afterv/orldly ideals. And hopefully,
though no one has a right to expect it, these efforts will
meet v/ith rewards.
Consequently, this value system is internalized , and the
promotion of these religious interests is self-motivated in
the case of each individual. But in the final analysis, the
essence of what is internalized is the antagonism to the ani-
mal instincts, and it is this antagonism which is the deter-
mining ground of this self-motivated promotion of slave mo-
rality. In other words, slave morality is capable of subdu-
ing the individual, because ressentiment has the capacity to
gain control of its strength while it is in the vulnerable
state of suffering from bad conscience. In particular, it
also suggests how a critical will ends up in deferring to the
interests of a morality which is all too assailable by
reason.
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Both moralities in Kant’s ethics
Because of the emphasis on universality in Kant's ethics,
it is easy to suppose that his views fall neatly into the ca-
tegory of slave morality, from Nietzsche's point of view.
But such a supposition disregards Nietzsche's noting the op-
position in Kant's philosophy of morality to critical reason.
Such an opposition suggests that insofar as reason is prac-
tical, it does not fall into the same category as that kind
of morality. This is where the distinction between master
and slave morality becomes analytically helpful, even if
Nietzsche did not drav/ it for precisely this application.
The solution is that Kant's ethics contains two different
strains: one qualifying as slave morality, the other as mas-
ter morality. And though the Nietzschean conceptual scheme
may seem unfainiliar in a Kantian context, the bifurcation to
which it applies is well-known to most commentators on Kant.
As seen in the Genealogy
,
master morality and slave moral-
ity supply to bad conscience tv'o different ways of making
'good'. Hence, bad conscience is the pre-condition of both,
and is the point of divergence. Thus, examination of what
qualifies as bad conscience in Kant's philosophy should ex-
pose the emergence of both master and slave values. As it
turns out, Kant's ethics is constituted by both of these very
different responses to bad conscience.
A preliminary account of how bad conscience can be con-
strued as being imbedded in Kant's philosophy has already
been touched upon, in the discussion above of the relation
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Toetween reason and criticism. The key to recognizing its
possible occurrence in Kant's thinking is the understanding
33
that for Nietzsche "v.dsdam wants us to be . . .a warrior,"
and criticism is an act of war against its target. Thus,
critique in Kant can be regarded as an act of aggression,
one which is susceptible to being thwarted, intimidated, and,
generally, inhibited. Kant’s aggressive instincts can be
seen to their best advantage in the sceptical side of the
first Critique
,
which culminates in the statements of the
'antithesis' side of the Antinomies, a series of attacks on
the oresumption that an appearance could attain the status
of being an absolute reality.
However, as a result of a confrontation with a more power-
ful force, this aggression is inhibited and turned inward.
The dogmatic 'thesis' side of the Antinomies, which note-
worthily contains "the foundation stones of morality and re-
ligion, according to Kant, is able to elude the sceptical
attack, by taking refuge in the possibility of- a non-empir-
ical reality. Such a possibility, as not entailing any fur-
ther claim about the nature of appearances, is therefore a
retreat beyond the range of sceptical weapons. Furthermore,
this dodge at the same time turns the attacker against it-
self.
This attack not only falls short of its target, but actu-
ally backfires on sceptical reason, because it itseli is
based on the very presumption which it is trying to attack.
That is, the 'thesis' claim that freedom is possible, is
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subject to scepticism only if it is denied the possibility
of a cause which is not an appearance. But to deny the lat-
ter possibility is to affirm that appearances are the ulti-.
mate reality. Hence, scepticism is exposed as presupposing
what it is trying to deny in its opponent. Here, then, is
the onset of reason's bad conscience, that is, its inhibition
by forces sympathetic to morality and religion, and the in-
ternalization of its critical aggressiveness.
The seeds of both 'bad* and 'evil' are present following
this failed attack. Reason can regard itself as 'bad' ac-
cording to its own standards, because of the irrationality
involved in its latent assumption that appearance, mere sen-
sible particulars, are the ultimate reality. At the same
time, because it attempts to attack a fundamental assumption
of morality and religion, it is 'evil' according to the
standards of the latter. It is interesting to note that
Ilietzsche is cautiously sympathetic v/ith Kant's plight here.
Confronted with the inability to refute the possibility of
what he calls an 'infinite interpetation, ’ his analogue to
the non-empirical realm into which Kant's dogmatist re-
treats, Nietzsche is "seized by a great shudder; but v;ho -
feels inclined immediately to deify"^^ that realm? he cau-
tiously asks, perhaps with Kant in mind.
The most debilitating aspect for reason's being inhibited
here, is that the prison is of its ov.n making. Committed to
scepticism, it cannot, unlike the dogmatist, accept support
from the possibility of a non-phenomenal realm, so it cannot
109
conclude, like the dogmatist can, that freedom is indeed pos-
sible. But if it is not possible to assume the possibilitj;'
of freedom, then sceptical freedom has no grounds for regard-
ing itself as free.
This leads in the first Critioue to the final assessment
of the bounds of reason in its theoretical-speculative use.
Reason has no free causality, plays no constitutive role, in
the theoretical-speculative sphere ,. which is not "its proper
territory."-^ Instead, its employment is alv/ays empirically
conditioned
,
with its highest function a merely regulative
one, that of effecting the maximum unity of the empirical
manifold. In this function, the synthetic powers of reason
serve the interests either of the sciences, in their pursuit
of Imowledge, or of the desires, in the pursuit of happiness.
But these assignments remain unsatisfactory to reason; it
is still 'bad' in its own eyes. For, it has yet to realize
its full potential. As articulated in its definition, its
synthetic powers are capable of more than regulatively syn-
thesizing the empirical realm into a maximum totality. It
has the resources to provide a ground for, to impose a fur-
ther condition upon, this regulative activity. This poten-
tial lies in the idea of the unconditioned which is the con-
dition for any regulative synthesis, a potential which re-
mains dormant in the theoretical-speculative sphere.
Reason finally makes 'good' by tapping that dormant poten-
tial and creating a formula for the unconditioned "within the
limits of its proper territory—that of practical
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• 37prxncxples." This condition is the idea of universal law
as such, and the full articulation of its unconditionality in
the practical sphere is the Fundamental Law of Pure Practical
Reason. It is the condition for any synthesis which serves
the empirically conditioned interests of the faculty of de-
sire. In other v;ords, pure reason is now at full strength,
having become practical.
Reason, and no longer sensibility, is now the condition of
any use of reason in the practical sahere. Hence, it is "a
oO
law to itself,"-^ or, in other words, is autonomous. As a
result, it is also a law for every rational being, since
"what appertains to or contradicts the genus . .
.
,
apper-
tains to or contradicts also the objects contained under that
39genus. ^ The latter xs the 'Prxncxple of Categorical Syl-
logisms' according to Kant's Logic
,
so the Fundarxental Law
is also a 'categorical' imperative, the genus in question be-
ing the rational agent.
But not every rational agent uses reason in the prescribed
way. Sometimes it is used to construct maxims vhich fail to
conform to the condition which the law dictates. Sxich maxims
are merely empirically conditioned, and acting upon them is
irrational. This is heteronomy of practical reason, or,
equivalently, heteronomy of the will, and it is 'bad' accord-
ing to reason.
With a manifold of rational agents at least thinkable,
various modes of rational interaction between them can be
spfecified, as can be various ways reason can govern the
Ill
self-development of the individual. Consequently, pure prac-
tical reason sets a goal for every rational being: for ad-
herence to the Fundamental Lav/ to become habitual. This
goal is the object of pure practical reason, otherwise knovn
as "virtue ... an autocracy of practical reason. Virtue
contains, in other words, consciousness of the power to mas-
ter one's inclinations when they rebel against the lav/."^*"^
V/ith the realization of virtue, autonomy becomes 'autocracy',
and reason governs reality. This "consciousness of mastery
over inclinations . . . brings forth a negative satisfaction
4l
with one's condition, i.e. contentment." So, the only
thing more which could be lacking for the individual once
virtue is achieved is that the action fully accomplishes
what is intended. Thus, if virtue is not the highest good of
pure practical reason, then the full success of virtuous ac-
tion could be.
The foregoing summary thus represents the strain of Kant's
ethics that seems to qualify as a master morality. It is a
product of strength from reason, and its standard of measure
is that of critical reason itself: rational action is
'good', irrational action is 'bad'. This is not an unfamil-
iar line in his thinking, but as he, as well as most com-
mentators, seems to have noticed, one concept is conspicuous-
ly absent. If, as this system seems to entail, the fadlure
to adhere to the Fundamental Law is a weakness of the will,
then the concept of moral responsibility seems impossible.
For, in any violation of the Law, the ground of determination
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of the action is external to the agent, who is in a state of
heteronomy. If so, then the external groimd, and not the
agent, is the cause of the offensive action, and the only
possible locus of responsibility. This would seem to be a
serious deficiency in a moral system.
But it is not, perhaps, a deficiency in a moral system
that places no value on the concept of moral deserts. In
other words, it is not, perhaps, a deficiency in a master
morality which has no interest in culpatory questions. On
the other hand, it is imacceptable to the morality and reli-
gion which Kant's critical weapons have already attacked
once. His thinking thus remains unredeemed according to
their standards; it is still potentially 'evil*.
Those standards are obviously also Kant's, as he attempts
to put the resources of pure practical reason in the service
of a defense of them. Kant's attitude is placatory, as evi-
denced by his acknowledgement that they at whose disposal he
has now placed himself possess "a certain degree of misolo-
42
gy—that is, a hatred of reason." From the outset it is
clear that a high priority on his agenda is an explanation of
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the concept of the "worthiness to be happy," which an ana-
lysis of the concepts of duty and obligation are meant to
help generate. It is here that reason begins to redeem it-
self, as Kant offers its categorical imperative as an ade-
quate formulation of the principle of duty, despite two con-
cessions reason seems forced to make. First, the categorical
imperative is offered to morality even though it is a law
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which conventional morality "admittedly does not conceive
thus abstractly in its universal form,"^^ an admission which
Kant seems to neglect in subsequent identifications of con-
ventional dutiful conduct with rational behavior, despite the
apparent essentiality of the distinction which he draws here
between them, i.e. regarding universality. Secondly, reason
seems to relinquish its role in the subsequent function of
the concept of categoricality, which loses its syllogistic
connotation, and is left instead as equivalent to a psycho-
logical sense of the term which has common currency.
Consequently, the Fundamental Law of Pure Practical Reason
is accepted as the 'Moral* Law, and virtue is established as
the supreme good. Except, virtue has gotten redefined to
suit the present project, as it is no longer the conscious-
ness of a power, but now merely an "unending progress.
As Nietzsche observes, "the aim now is to preclude pessimis-
tically, once and for all, the prospect of a final dis-
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charge" of the debt inherent in being human. In tium, as
virtue is connected to personal happiness in the concept of
the highest good, the quantificatory, and hence, contractual,
senses of the concepts of duty and obligation pre-empt their
modal sense, with the introduction of the quantificational
concept of proportionality. Here Kant leaves no doubt about
his committments: morality is the doctrine of "how we are to
47be worthy of happiness," ' and "the moral law leads to reli-
gion.
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Indeed, it does lead Kant to write about religion, but he
is still faced with the problem of explaining the concept of
moral responsibility in such a way that the concept of de-
servedness is possible. So, the latter becomes the main
theme in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone , which
from a Nietzschean point of view might be better called "Rea-
son Within the Limits of Ressentiment . " Here Kant introduces
a new concept of will, one not equivalent to practical rea-
son, but now defined as "free choice. Such a faculty is
a clear example of what to Nietzsche is the kind of neutral
substratum which is a product of ressentiment . At the same
time, autonomy also gets redefined, since the law which free
choice gives to itself is not of its own making, whereas the
law which practical reason gives to itself is of its own mak-
ing.
As a result, Kant is now prepared to distinguish mere
weakness of the will from vice, "an intentional transgres-
sion, the "effect"^^ of which is punishment, though "no
one has the moral title to inflict punishment and to avenge
the injuries sustained by man except Him who is also the su-
preme lawgiver . . . namely God."^ The purpose of the con-
cept of the highest good seems quite plain here: to ration-
alize vicarious vengeance. Now Nietzsche does not deny that
such sublimation can be "an artifice for the preservation of
life,"^^ but not if it succeeds in "poisoning the con-
sciences"^^ of those who refuse to accept the validity of the
concepts of free choice and intentional transgression, on
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rational grounds. Kant's concept of the highest good does
seem, on a Nietzschean analysis, to be a product of a poison-
ed conscience, one in which ressentiment has gotten the upper
hand on reason.
Conclusions
Therefore, according to a Nietzschean approach to the
question, happiness proportionate to virtue is not the high-
est good of Kant's pure practical reason, despite Kant's con-
tentions to the contrary. Whereas Kant does perhaps succeed
in showing that it is the highest good for a being possessing
freedom of choice, it does not necessarily follow that it is
the highest good for a rational being. In fact, there is
some further question as to whether or not virtue for the for-
mer, i.e. an unending progress, is also that for the latter,
i.e. the consciousness of a power secured. Granted that in
both cases empirically conditioned self-interest is not
'good', for one side, but not for the other, this can be
classified as an intentional transgression. Even if the evi-
dence is inconclusive, Kant can at various points in his
writings be oonstrued as agreeing with that classification.
In my next, and final, chapter, I will consider some of
the consequences of these conclusions, which will prepare the
way for a more decisive Nietzschean criticism of Kant's high-
est good. Then, the latter will be compared with those pre-
viously discussed. Finally, I will defend the appropriation
of Nietzsche which I have been employing.
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CHAPTER 4
THE VALUE OF HAPPINESS IN RATIONAL ETHICS
Introduction
In the previous chapter I began developing a Nietzschean
criticism of Kant’s highest good, by applying Nietzsche's an-
alysis of ressentiment to the latter concept. The main con-
clusion of what was developed is that insofar as that concept
entails a concept of deserved unhappiness, it is not a pro-
duct of pure practical reason. The key point in the Nietz-
schean analysis is that attributing deserved unhappiness in-
volves taking an accusatorial posture toward a will, the
'elective will', which is essentially neither rational nor
irrational. But such a will is distinct from, if not incon-
sistent with, the more basic Kantian concept of the 'legis-
lative will', which is either rational or irrational, and no-
thing besides. This contrast exemplifies the Nietzschean
distinction between ressentiment-based slave morality, and
master morality, which, while contemptuous of the weakness of
irrationality, is on guard against a lapse into an equally
weak accusatorial position.
As this suggests, though, the scope of what is criticized
therein is limited. The criticism pertains only to the con-
cept of deserved unhappiness; but Kant's highest good also in-
cludes a concept of deserved happiness, as well as, more gen-
erally, the concept of virtue in combination with happiness.
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regardless of how such combination might be explained. At
this point, then, his highest good can still be defended as
rational against the Nietzschean charge. It is thus the pur-
pose of this chapter to re-mount the charge, by targeting
those features which the previous effort leaves untouched. I
will start by identifying some difficulties with the concept
of deserved happiness, one of which is similar to the problem
with the concept of deserved unhappiness. This discussion
will lead into the central point of the criticism, which ap-
plies to any way of combining virtue and happiness as the
highest good. As Nietzsche maintains in the Genealogy and in
the rest of his writings, there exist radically opposed eval-
uative orders, and, as I have argued in the previous chapter,
Kant's ethics vacillates between opposing orders. Given such
vacillation, the question of the value of happiness for Kant
remains unclear, and so, therefore, does the question as to
whether it is a 'good' according to pure practical reason.
Clearly, if the value which Kant's highest good implies hap-
piness has is inconsistent with the value which pure practi-
cal reason places on it, then his highest good is not a pro-
duct of pure practical reason. The following will identify
such an inconsistency, which, obviously, will also tell
against the postulate of the existence of God.
The remainder of the chapter will consider some of the im-
plications of these results. First, I will compare the
Nietzschean criticism with those of Beck, Wood, Schopenhauer,
and the utilitarian. Then, I will defend my use of Nietzsche.
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Criticism of the concept of deserved hap-pinesa
Even though the concept of deserved happiness is much less
obviously an expression of ressentiment than is the concept
of deserved unhappiness, a similar criticism applies to it.
Both concepts seem to presuppose an object of imputation
which is absolutely accountable for its behavior. A more
cynical Nietzschean could maintain that the desire to reward
is as much a vicarious attempt to harness the strength of an
agent, as is the desire to punish, and, so, is as irrational.
Such cynicism aside, though, doubts as to the rationality of
such a concept of agency remain. Agency which is absolutely
accountable for its actions still seems to require the pos-
session of a free will which is essentially neutral with re-
spect to the alternatives of obeying reason or not. But rea-
son is certainly not essentially neutral with respect to such
alternatives, so it could not be the origin of the concept of
such agency. Hence, nor could the concepts of absolute ac-
countability and, therefore, of deserved happiness, be those
of pure practical reason.
This line of argiiment seems to leave Kant room to modify
that concept of free will, in order to avoid sacrificing its
rationality while still retaining the possibility of a con-
nection to happiness. He already has at his disposal a con-
cept of will which is rational by virtue of it being prac-
tical reason following its own pure principles, and which is
free by virtue of its being detached from heteronomous
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forces. Since this concept of free will excludes the possi-
bility of free irrationality, clearly the concept of deserved
punishment must be abandoned, as has already been argued.
This still leaves open the possibility of reward, except now
what would merit the reward would be not the exercise of
freedom but, rather, the attainment to freedom. Absolute re-
sponsibility would be an accomplishment, and reward a sign of
recognition of that accomplishment.
However, such a modification does not quite dispense en-
tirely with the concept of deserved punishment. Rather, it
merely reappears in a similarly modified guise. Between re-
ward and punishment lies abandonment, but in the face of po-
tential danger, abandonment is indistinguishable from punish-
ment. Hence, it seems doubtful that Kant can completely pur-
ify his concept of deserved happiness through this line of
modification. The difficulties he faces here come into even
sharper focus, with the prospect of trying to square his view
of God as the author of the natural world, with the proposed
line here that abandonment to natural dangers is not punish-
ment.
Kant's claim that the concept of happiness proportionate
to virtue is a concept of pure practical reason, is thus open
to serious doubt. With the rationality of the concept of de-
served unhappiness even more vulnerable to challenge, his at-
tempt to implicate a system of reward and punishment in ra-
tional ethics seems to be unsuccessful. It would be a mis-
take here to single out the concept of deserved unhappiness
123
as the stxambling block. Rather, it is in the latter that
what is a general problem is more transparent, for, it is
there that the question concerning the interest of reason in
physical states focuses on the stickier question of the ra-
tionality of suffering. Now, Kant could make a more con-
vincing case for the rationality of punishment by arguing
that punishment promotes virtue, yet nothing of the sort is
apparent in the relevant passages. Perhaps this is because
to take such a line would commit him to further maintain that
rewards are rational where they promote virtue. Again, no-
thing of the sort is apparent where it might be relevant,
perhaps because he is aware of the difficulties such an ap-
proach would plunge him into. As will be seen shortly, to
allow that happiness can promote virtue would force him to
abandon a position which he clings to, despite the dictates
of reason.
The value of happiness
In some respects, the foregoing criticisms are not espe-
cially significant. They raise doubts about the rationality
of Kant's treatment of accoimtability
,
but fail to go so far'
as to show the impossibility of his silencing the doubts.
More important, though, is that what is under attack is not
the central feature of his position. His account of a world
governed by a law of just deserts is merely a digression from
his main concern, which is to demonstrate the possibility of
an appropriate combination of virtue and happiness. Hence,
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the irrationality of his concept of such a world does not
seem to imply the irrationality of the main concept. In
other words, the foregoing criticisms, even if valid, would
damage nothing that is vital for Kant.
However, they do open up other lines of concern which may
not be so insignificant. Even if Kant does not explicitly
defend the punishment of irrationality, the fact that it is
not difficult to construe him as implicitly doing so is tell-
ing enough. As has been mentioned several times, the strict
derivation of the concept of a rational will which he pre-
sents in the Groiuidwork
, clearly precludes the possibility of
action which is free and irrational. It straightforwardly
follows from that concept that holding the irrational abso-
lutely accountable is indefensible. Yet he is certainly not
maintaining its indefensibility in the second Critique
,
and
in Religion and Metaphysic of Morals he does defend punish-
ment. Hence, there is justification in regarding it as pos-
sible that his silence about punishment in the second
Critique is an endorsement of his later position, and a devi-
ation from his earlier one. If so, he is judging that it is
'good', whereas according to another position found in his
works, it is 'bad'. When put in these terms, Kant's \mcer-
tainty about deserved unhappiness raises the Nietzschean sus-
picion, that what could be regarded as a principled reconsi-
deration of the value of punishment, is actually a change of
evaluative principles. If Kant is indeed shifting principles
here, then regardless of the appearance of the term 'reason'
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in these passages, his principles may no longer be 'ration-
al' in his original sense of the term.
Thus, doubts about the rationality of a system of just
deserts suffice to open up questions about just what evalu-
ative principles are in effect when he defends the system,
and such questions are indeed pertinent beyond the concept of
deservedness. They are, more significantly, relevant to what
is more than a digression like the concept of deservedness.
Namely, they raise doubts as to whether or not his highest
'good* is 'good* according to pure practical reason.
More specifically, Kant's highest 'good' is a rational
'good' only if reason concurs with three of his judgements.
First, he maintains that virtue is 'good'. Second, he claims
that happiness is 'good'. Third, he modifies the latter by
characterizing its value as being 'conditional'. Frrrther-
more, his concept involves a fxarther judgement. 'Highest'
is also evaluative, since it implies that virtue combined
with happiness is 'better' than virtue by itself. Hence, his
highest good entails four judgements which must conform to
the standards of reason.
Now, the first of these can be dismissed as apparently un-
problematic. Virtue can be defined by Kant as the disposi-
tion to act only according to pure practical reason, without
some of the substantive connotation, in the guise of specific
duties, that he regularly relies on to fill out this defini-
tion. Reason can without difficulty judge the disposition to
act rationally to be good.
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With the other three, however, greater difficulties face
Kant. To begin with, it is surely not reason which desig-
nates happiness unqualified as '.good'
,
since happiness can
be attained while turning a deaf ear to the dictates of rea-
son. Nor is it valid to assume that because happiness is a
natural 'good' that it is therefore a rational 'good'. Now
Kant might want to object that his position is being misre-
presented here, since what he claims is not that happiness
is 'good', but rather that it is 'good' under certain condi-
tions. However, the validity of such an objection depends on
how he settles a further point. By contending that virtue
with happiness is 'better' than virtue without it, his im-
plication is that happiness is in some sense 'good'. But
if the sense in question is not the conditional one that he
otherwise insists upon, then it is not a misrepresentation to
characterize him as designating happiness as 'good'. Whether
or not he settles this point satisfactorily will be taken up
shortly.
First, though, the concept of 'conditionally good' needs
to be clarified and defended. At first glance, this would
seem to be a routine matter, because Kant relies on it fre-
quently enough, and with apparent confidence. It seems to
mean for him that once a given condition obtains, namely,
virtue, if something else, e.g. happiness, were also to ob-
tain, then the latter would be 'good', while it would not be
'good' in the absence of the condition. The point seems to
127
be that the prior presence of virtue somehow transforms hap-
piness from something not 'good' into something 'good'.
On closer examination, though, the matter is not only not
so routine, but may be hopeless If the prior presence of
virtue is sufficient to transform something into something
'good', then it is sufficient to transform unhappiness into
something 'good*. If so, then punishing the virtuous would
be as justified as rewarding them. Clearly, Kant prefers re-
warding the virtuous to punishing them, so it must be on a
characteristic that happiness,: but not unhappiness, possess-
es even in the absence of virtue, that he bases his prefer-
ence. But to do so is to deem it unconditionally 'good',
according to the proposed explanation of the concept of con-
ditionality. As has been argued, reason finds such an evalu-
ation unacceptable, so Kant's confidence in this version of
the concept of conditional goodness would seem to be mis-
placed.
Perhaps more worthy of his confidence is an alternative
account of conditional goodness, and its possession by hap-
piness. As he puts it is the Groundwork
.
"To assure one's
own happiness is a duty (at least indirectly); for discon-
tent with one's state, in a press of cares and amidst unsa-
tisfied wants, might easily become a great temptation to the
transgression of duty."^ He explains further in the Meta-
physic of Morals that for "the duty of one's own happiness
. . . the end is not the agent's happiness but his morality,
..2
and happiness is merely a means . .
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This account is much more satisfactory, for several rea-
sons. First, it offers a clear-cut explanation of the con-
cept of conditionality, characterizing it as the relation of
a means with respect to its end. Second, it clearly distin-
guishes the value of happiness from that of unhappiness,
since it holds that happiness more effectively promotes mo-
rality. Third, both of the previous are completely agreeable
to pure practical reason: the end-means relation is one of
practical reason's own, and the implied evaluation of happi-
ness is based on its capacity to promote rational behavior.
Reason can have no quibble with these elements. Furthermore,
Kant can be seen to advocate this account at widely separated
stages of his development, so it is less likely that it is
subject anywhere to a shift in or abandonment of principles.
Unfortunately, though, it seems linlikely that this alter-
native can be of help for him in defending his concept of the
highest good. The view that the proper relation between hap-
piness and virtue is means-end is provocative, fruitful, and
instructive. It levels an effective challenge at the vacuity
of those who pursue happiness for its own sake. It suggests
that happiness is useful not merely as a guard against temp-
tation, but, furthermore, in a positive sense, as a state of
accumulated resources at the disposal of the virtuous dispo-
sition. Casting happiness in the latter light shows that it
is not the stable condition many take it to be. Such a prin-
ciple is strong enough to support an entire ethical system,
and certainly seems at times tb be the point that Kant wants
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to drive home. However, in the final analysis, these com-
mendable features tell against his concept of the highest
good, so it is not altogether surprising that it does not
seem to be this concept of conditionality which he uses to
explain his highest good.
When the concept of conditionality is understood as means-
end, it seems undisputable that reason can concur that happi-
ness is a conditional good. But less clear is if its way .of
combining virtue and happiness is suitable for Kant's high-
est good. If it is suitable, then what must apply to it is
his judgement that virtue with happiness is ’better' than
virtue without. At first glance, it might seem as if it does
apply, since it entails that happiness can be a 'more effec-
tive' means to virtue than unhappiness.
However, by asserting that virtue with happiness is 'bet-
ter' than virtue without, he cannot be asserting that happi-
ness is 'more useful' than unhappiness. For, if happiness is
a means to virtue, then virtue is a state which cannot obtain
so long as happiness is retained. This is a feature of any
means-end relation according to the Kantian concept of time.
The presence of the means implies that the end has yet to be
achieved, while the presence of the end implies that a trans-
ition from the means has already occurred. Hence, it is not
true of virtue and happiness here that their compresence is
'better' than virtue by itself. In which case, the means-end
construal of the relation between virtue and happiness does
not seem to suit Kant's concept of their relation in his
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highest good. Making a means available to someone who is
likely to put it to further use is a lot different than re-
warding them.
Hence, if the means-end concept of conditionality is not
suited to his highest good, then it must be the 'prior pre-
sence' one which he has in mind. The latter, the only alter-
native, is the concept in which happiness is a conditional
'good' because it is achieved given the prior presence of
virtue. But if that is the only possibility, then, as has
already been argued, Kant needs a further premise to explain
why happiness is 'better' for virtue than is unhappiness. To
do so, he needs to distinguish happiness from unhappiness in-
dependently from their presence to virtue, wherein both are
equally 'good'. But to distinguish them in this way is to
identify a feature of happiness which is unconditionally
'good'. Hence, it is not misleading to represent Kant here
as judging happiness to be unconditionally 'good'. Since
reason cannot concur with such a judgement, it has to be con-
cluded that Kant's concept of the highest good stands as a
divergence from the principles of pure practical reason
which he had earlier introduced.
This conclusion can be supported by a deeper understanding
of what he is trying to accomplish with his concept of the
highest good. Even though his purported interest is to de-
fend the compossibility of virtue and happiness, closer ex-
amination reveals at least one, more basic, goal motivating
him. As he asks in the first Critique , "If I do what I ought
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to do, what may I then hope?"3 Along the same lines, as he
comments about Spinoza, who refuses to hope to be rewarded
for virtue, "the end which this right-minded man would have,
and ought to have, in his pursuit of the moral law, would
certainly have to be abandoned by him as impossible."^
Kant’s primary interest in these is to defend the possibili-
ty, not so much of happiness, but, rather, of hope. Clearly,
the possibility of hope logically implies that of happiness,
but the compresence which he trying to establish is that of
virtue and hope. For, what he is trying to resolve is a "na-
tural dialectic—that is, a disposition to quibble with these
strict laws of duty."^ The origin of this disposition to
quibble is "our wishes and inclinations."^ The highest good
would appease this disposition sufficiently by offering the
mere hope of deferred satisfaction. Hence, there is also a
derivative necessity to explain the possibility of a reward
for virtue. But, on this understanding of Kant's interests,
it is quite clear that the implied judgement that happiness
is 'good', in any sense, originates in wishes and inclina-
tions, and not in reason.
Reason and the existence of God
To reject, in the name of reason, Kant’s highest good, is
not to underestimate the problem which apparently motivates
it. As has been pointed out, he does have at his disposal
a concept of virtue and happiness which seems quite amenable
to reason. So constituted, that concept must have ‘
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something to say about the struggle with inclination in the
pursuit of morality.
Kant's expressed solution is to offer hope and compensa-
tion for self-sacrifice, and perhaps there is some immediate
educative advantage to such an approach. But ultimately he
is still pandering to what are elsewhere for him baser in-
stincts, i.e. those which, obeying piure practical reason, he
had struggled to overcome. In contrast, the implied alter-
native pedagogy recommends actively cultivating a re-orien-
tation of priorities, which would elevate the baser instincts
and desires. It recommends, for example, engendering the at-
titude that what is undesirable about aimless gratification
is that in its essential instability it is exposed to what-
ever external forces would harness what has been accumulated.
Thus, it advocates the activation and sublimation of the in-
stincts, not their repression and subsequent release towards
perhaps merely vicarious possibilities. Regardless of which
is the better pedagogic strategy, it cannot be maintained
that by abandoning his concept of the highest good, Kant
would be leaving the dialectic in question unresolved.
On the other hand, abandoning it would seem to leave an-
other goal unrealized. A second interest which his highest
good serves is to necessitate the postulate of the existence
of God. If his highest good is that of reason, and if the
rewarding of virtue is possible only if God exists, then rea-
son must postulate the existence of God in order to perfect
its system. But it is now established that his highest good
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is not that of reason, which releases reason from that reli-
gious need. Nor does embracing the alternative combination
of virtue and happiness re-commit reason to God's existence.
For, regardless of the greater utility of happiness to virtue
divine dispensation would be disruptive. To intervene in the
pursuit of happiness where the latter is in turn conceived
as a means to virtue, would be to intervene in the cultiva-
tion of virtue. But the cultivation of virtue is entirely
the responsibility of the agent in question. Reason does not
merely not require divine intervention here, it rejects it as
unwanted. Thus, Kant cannot embrace the alternative account
and still retain his argument for the relevant religious ram-
ifications. The fact that he does not embrace it gives some
indication of what his priorities are in the relevant pas-
sages .
Comparison with the other commentaries
These conclusions tend to confirm the Nietzschean hypo-
thesis, that Kant's highest good represents a turnabout, from
a position that is much more clearly aligned with the prin-
ciples of pure practical reason. His construal, in his high-
est good, of the relation between virtue and happiness stands
a rigorously rational version of that relation on its head.
Where, in the latter, happiness is a means to virtue, in the
former, virtue serves as a means to happiness. Such an in-
version conforms to the pattern explained in the Genealogy .
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According to Nietzsche there, slave morality is not mere-
ly inverse with respect to master morality, it originates as
a reaction to it, in the form of vicarious usurpation of it.
As has been argued, this model seems to apply to the develop-
ment of Kant's ethics. In its fundamental form, his ethics
is based solely on a rational principle, in which reason ap-
pears as an unconditionally commanding voice which is the
origin of all moral evaluation. However, by the time he
reaches the latter stages of his second Critique
, the valid-
ity of his ethical system depends on the compossibility of
freedom and irrationality, on belief in the existence of God,
and on the possibility of rewarding the virtuous. Closer ex-
amination reveals, though, that it is not pure practical rea-
son which is making these demands on the system. For reason,
irrationality is unfreedom, and divine intervention is med-
dling. Furthermore, once it becomes clear that in the demand
for the possibility of deserved happiness, happiness is
judged to be imconditionality 'good', then it is obvious
that reason is no longer in command and the soitrce of evalu-
ation. Rather, an inversion now prevails, to the extent that
pure practical reason can be vilified for refusing to compro-
mise with common morality, and for rejecting the purported
need to believe in the existence of Kant's God.
To summarize, then, the Nietzschean criticism concludes
that Kant's highest good is not a concept of pure practical
reason. This is because, first, implicit in his concept is a
judgement that happiness is in some sense 'good', and.
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second, it is not pure practical reason making that judge-
ment. Rather, this, and other judgements which are involved
in his discussion, represent an inversion of a position which
is much more clearly consistent with the principles of pure
practical reason. As such, this criticism stands as, if not
a more effective one, at least a distinctive contribution to
the literature on the topic.
This contribution can be assessed by considering its posi-
tion with respect to the views discussed in the earlier chap-
ters of this work. Right away, it is obvious that this posi-
tion distinguishes itself from those which arrive at the op-
posite conclusion. Wood, for one, believes that Kant's high-
est good is not inconsistent with pure practical reason. His
point is that the value of happiness cannot be confused
with the value of the pursuit of happiness. Hence, as he ar-
gues, Kant does not deviate from a reason which denies that
the pursuit of happiness is 'good', when he maintains that
happiness, as represented in his highest good, is 'good'.
However, Wood is neglecting one point, and is erroneous
about another. That a judgement about the pursuit of happi-
ness does not imply a judgement about happiness, does not
settle the question as to what is the origin of the proposed
judgement about happiness. In other words, he falls short of
explaining why reason regards happiness as 'good', insofar as
it is 'better' than unhappiness. Second, he is partially in-
correct in asserting that reason does not regard the pursuit
of happiness as 'good'. This is because, as has been seen.
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reason does regard the pursuit of happiness a 'good' when
happiness is viewed as a means to virtue. Consequently, his
defense of Kant does not seem to hold up.
Nor does the utilitarian defense hold up. It argues that
Kant's highest good is basically a formula for univeral hap-
piness which singles out personal happiness as one of the com-
ponents of the latter. No discrepancy from rational prin-
ciples is involved here, it continues, for the law of pure
practical reason is a formula for the production of univer-
sal happiness to begin with. It must be such a formula, ar-
gues Mill, for otherwise it could generate "the most outrage-
ously immoral rules of conduct."'^ Perhaps Kant does come to
agree with Mill about this, but if he does, then he is very
nicely confirming Nietzschean suspicions. For, Mill is quite
plainly here measuring rational principles by some other
standard of conduct, which amounts to an abandonment of rea-
son if the latter has been previously asserted to be the mea-
sure of goodness. The utilitarian defense thus only rein-
forces the opposition.
On the other hand, the Nietzschean criticism also distin-
guishes itself from those which share its conclusion. Scho-
penhauer argues that Kant's moral law is a formula for the
cultivation of selflessness. But, he continues, not only is
the pursuit of happiness selfish, so too is the state of hap-
piness, since it is a state of individuation. If so, then
happiness is 'evil', according to Kant's original principles,
and its presence in his highest good is actually corruptive.
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Schopenhauer thus agrees with the view being advanced here
that the crucial question concerns the origin of thV evalu-
ation of happiness which is implied in Kant's highest good.
Reserving further discussion of Nietzsche's position on the
topic of selfhood for below, it suffices here to indicate one
unsatisfactory aspect of Schopenhauer's argument. To insist
that happiness is inescapably 'evil' according to the moral
law, is to deny that it can promote virtue. But if he wants
to hold to the latter denial, then he is committing himself
to the position that a philanthropist cam have no use for
material resources or the physical well-being which could en-
hance and advance philanthropic activity. Clearly, though,
an incapacitated philanthropist cannot serve the philanthro-
pic cause, so Schopenhauer need not commit either himself or
Kant to the position that happiness is essentially 'evil'.
To do so could encourage the suspicion that his commitments
are to self-hate rather than to philanthropism.
A similar problem attaches to an otherwise satisfactory
line from Beck. He too recognizes that the evaluation of
happiness in Kant's highest good is the key question. His
contention is that nowhere in either the expression of its
principle, or in its implementation, does reason demonstrate
a preference for either happiness or unhappiness. Such in-
difference suggests to him that happiness is essentially val-
ueless, according to reason, in which case it cannot be rea-
son which produces Kant's highest good.
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As with Schopenhauer, Beck misses the flexibility of rea-
son to, for example, regard happiness as *good' xmder at
least some circumstances. As such, it again creates the sus-
picion that he is withholding from reason acknowledgement of
its authority to originate values. Also, though he effec-
tively draws attention to Kant's vacillating concept of will
as, in one respect legislative, and as, in another, elective,
he seems to have no objection to the dual characterization.
Hence, he has no reason to associate this dichotomy with the
inconsistencies in Kant’s highest good, as does the Nietz-
schean criticism.
Thus, this criticism makes a distinctive contribution to
the literature on the topic. It seems to take an effective
stand against the opposition, from a point of view which is
different from others of like mind. Indeed, there is some
justification to presuming that its arg^lments are even more
decisive than the latter. If so, it is because it examines
more thoroughly than the others the question of the evalu-
ation of happiness by pure practical reason.
The Nietzschean side of Kant
The foregoing critique has been advanced on the basis of
Nietzschean categories, namely 'master morality' and 'slave
morality' . It seems unarguable that Nietzsche approves of
the former, but has a negative attitude towards the latter.
This implies, then, that he disapproves of Kant's valuation
of happiness as> it is presented in his highest good. Now
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there seems nothing controversial about attributing such an
estimate of the worth of happiness to Nietzsche. However,
less unquestionable is the implied Nietzschean affirmation
which Kant receives.
Pure practical reason has been classified as 'master mo-
rality', thereby implying that it meets with Nietzschean ap-
proval. Weighing against such a presumption about Nietzsche,
though, are numerous apparently disparaging references to
Kant throughout his writings. For example, Kant is identi-
fied as one of the principle figures in the philosophical
tradition, in the chapter of Twilight of the Idols which at-
tacks '"Reason" in Philosophy'. More specifically, as he
puts it in The Anti-Christ
, "a virtue ... as Kant desired
it, impersonal aind universal
—
phantom, expression of decline,
of the final exhaustion of life . . . each of us should de-
Q
vise his own virtue, his own categorical imperative." Such
Nietzschean opposition to the rationalist tradition, imper-
sonalism, and universalism would seem to imply a like atti-
tude towards pure practical reason.
Indeed, a variety of commentators appear to take such a
position on the question of Nietzsche's view of Kant. For
example, Ofelia Schutte argues that because of Kant's in-
volvement in the tradition in question, Nietzsche is "gener-
ally critical"^ of him. Georg Lukacs is even more definite
on this point. Portraying Nietzsche as an irrationalist and
an egoist, Lukacs maintains that "Nietzsche emerges as a vig-
orous critic of ethics past and present, philosophical and
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above all Kantian as well as Christian-theological. Even
Deleuze, who elsewhere is receptive to the Kantian influence
on Nietzsche, agrees that they are opposed when it comes to
a Nietzschean "thought which thinks against reason.
It therefore seems disputable that pure practical reason
counts as an instance of Nietzschean master morality, and
that a critique which affirms it is 'Nietzschean'. But de-
spite the merits of these challenges, they are unpersuasive.
Their primary weaknesses are that they seem not to apply to
some important passages in both philosophers' works, and that
autonomy is a form of mastery.
For example, it is unclear how these challenges square
with Nietzsche's comments in 'Schopenhauer as Educator', on
the danger posed by despair of the truth. There he observes
that "this danger attends every thinker who sets out from the
Kantian philosophy, provided he is a vigorous and whole man
in suffering and desire and not a mere clattering thought-
and calculating-machine. Now we all know very well the
shameful implications of this presupposition; it seems to me,
indeed, that Kant has had a living and life-transforming in-
fluence on only a very few men. One can read everywhere, I
know, that since this quiet scholar produced his work a re-
volution has taken place in every domain of the spirit; but I
cannot believe it. For I cannot see it in those men who
would themselves have to be revolutionized before a revolu-
tion could take place in any whole domain whatever. If Kant
ever should begin to exercise any wide influence we shall be
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aware of it in the form of gnawing and disintegrating scepti-
cism and relativism? and only in the most active and noble
spirits who have never been able to exist in a state of doubt
would there appear instead that undermining and despair of
all truth.
These are hardly words of contempt from Nietzsche, espe-
cially insofar as they include the designation 'noble* with
respect to Kantian thinking. They also express a further
consideration which must be regarded as a factor in his at-
titude towards Kant. He clearly distinguishes between two
kinds of response to Kant, and equally clearly establishes
that his contempt attaches to only one of these kinds. This
latter kind is the shallow mere dabbler in Kantianism, and it
is also the preponderant kind, as Nietzsche sees it. Whether
or not the latter is a correct observation on the part of
Nietzsche, it is nevertheless an alert to the possibility
that a passage in which Nietzsche appears to attack Kant,
might in fact be aiming at one of these shallow appropria-
tions of Kant. Of course, as has been discussed at
length
above, Kant himself is the target of at least some Nietz-
schean criticism.
In contrast, according to Nietzsche, is Schopenhauer,
who
does reflect the deep Kantian influence, thereby
commanding
Nietzsche's admiration in subsequent passages. But in
re-
viewing his description of Schopenhauer's philosophical
de-
velopment, in Ecce Homo . Nietzsche shares the
realization
that in it "my innermost history, my becoming, is
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inscribed ... at bottom it is admittedly not 'Schopenhauer
as Educator' that speaks here, but his opposite, 'Nietzsche
IS
as Educator'." Therefore it seems safe to assume that
Nietzsche coimts himself as one of those who has thought Kant
through thoroughly. If so, then, for example, his own well-
known disintegrating scepticism and relativism carries a
tacit acknowledgement of Kant, and, moreover, a tacit approv-
al of the aspect of Kant's thinking in question.
The disintegrating Kantian doctrine which Nietzsche refers
to here is the thesis that all empirical knowledge is contin-
gent. But one main reason why Nietzsche opposes himself to
Schopenhauer in this context is that while for the latter the
consequent despair of truth lingers as pessimism, he, to the
contrary, transforms it into an occasion for "ultimate liber-
ation and irresponsibility."^^ Kant helps explain why Nietz-
sche might react this way, when he asks "by what right can we
make what is perhaps valid only under the contingent condi-
tions of humainity into an object of unlimited reverence as a
universal precept for every rational nature?" ^ Conventional
morality is in principle received morality, since its claims
are always cognized under empirical conditions, say, as being
heard or read. Hence, it constitutes a body of empirical
knowledge, in which case its truth is always contingent, ac-
cording to the Kantian thesis. It is thus unclear why it
might be maintained that Nietzsche disapproves of this as-
pect of Kant's view of conventional morality. Furthermore,
what Kant says here indicates that he might agree with
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Nietzsche's opinion of any conventionalized versions of his
ovm ethics, which he may not have lived long enough to en-
counter.
But, as Nietzsche concedes, such periods of liberation and
irresponsibility are impermanent, as the species-based in-
stinct for ethics, "which is at work equally in the highest
and the basest men,"^^ reasserts itself once again. Because
of both the gravity, in its contrast with irresponsibility,
of ethics, and the irony that ethics compels belief in the
undemonstrable, Nietzsche refers to teachers of ethics as
"tragedians. Hence, there are for him both high and base
kinds of these 'tragedians', and when he introduces his char-
acter Zarathustra with "The tragedy begins," this is an
introduction to his noble ethics. When Zarathustra elabo-
rates on his teaching, he describes three stages of develop-
ment, the ultimate goal of which is "innocence and forgetful-
ness, ... a self-propelling wheel, a first motion, . . .
the spirit now wills its own will." ^ As has been already
discussed in the previous chapter, these synonyms for free-
dom' and 'self-causality' are given a more traditional desig-
nation in the Genealogy , namely, 'autonomy', as Nietzsche
again implicates the concept in master morality. Of course,
the reason why he has a tradition to evoke in that work is
Kant's ethics. The terminological reference is to Kant's
formulation that "Autonomy of the will is the property the
will has of being a law to itself ... is the sole prin-
^ .i20
ciple of ethics.
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With such self-causality, a certain attitude towards one-
self IS cultivated. As Nietzsche puts it, "The noble soul
has reverence for itself. But this would appear to put
him at odds with Kant, who argues that "solely reverence for
the law is the motive which can give an action moral
22
worth." However, Kant, lending support to the thesis that
his ethics is dichotomous, immediately begins to vary his de-
finition of the correct object of reverence, with, "this
ideal will which can be ours is the proper object of rever-
ence." Later, he still further elaborates that "the law
interests us because it is valid for us as men in virtue of
sprung from our will as intelligence and so from our
2,hproper self." In other words, it is the self, not merely
the law or the will, which is the proper object of reverence,
on this elaboration. Since this self is autonomous, it is
noble, according to Nietzsche, so there is provisional agree-
ment between the two on the question of reverence.
Nietzsche reveals more about his concept of self in his
expression of admiration for Goethe: "What he aspired to
was totality; he strove against the separation of reason,
sensuality, feeling, will (. . . Kant, the antipodes of Goe-
the): he disciplined himself to a whole, he created him-
self." These comments help explain his attack, '"Reason"
in Philosophy'
,
in which one of his targets is the tendency
"to divide the world into a 'real' and an 'apparent' world,
whether in the manner of Christianity or in the manner of
Kant." His use of quotation marks in that title both
145
distances him from a certain use of the term 'reason' and,
furthermore, exposes the anomaly involved in a terminology
which attributes to a faculty generally associated with the
activity of integration, a disjoint ontology. But Kant on
at least one occasion appears to take greater care than the
rest of this tradition, when he distinguishes between taking
one standpoint when by means of freedom we conceive our-
selves as causes acting a priori , and another standpoint
when we contemplate ourselves with reference to our actions
as effects which we see before our eyes."^"^ Here Kant care-
fully avoids hypostasizing the products of the two stand-
points, and implies the existence of a comprehensive stand-
point which embraces the two, i.e. the one to which both are
detectable. In so doing, he stands closer to the Goethean
concept of self which Nietzsche admires. Indeed, Kant pro-
ceeds to identify the comprehensive standpoint with the free
standpoint, since both are nothing but reason. If Nietzsche
were also to identify the Goethean totalizing activity as
being reason, which would not be unjustified, then these con-
cepts of selfhood would converge.
In any case, these considerations also clarify Nietzsche's
attack on universalism. What he calls for in opposition to
universalism is a creative individualism for each of us. But
the latter is nothing other than universal autonomy, which is
both Kantian and universalistic . Hence, it is not distri-
butive universalism which he is rejecting. Rather, it is ab-
stract universalism, presumed to be uncreated, which is his
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target. Such universalism is merely another manifestation of
the ontological dualism which denigrates earthly existence
and fragments selfhood, the large-scale manifestation of
which is the social homogenization which to Nietzsche is a
mark of the weakening of the species.
Now, Kant often seems to do little to discourage the in-
terpretation that he is anti-naturalistically promoting such
homogenization with his ethics. But such an interpretation
is a partial one. To begin with, charges of anti-naturalism
seem misplaced when Kant describes autonomy of the will as
being "nature's purpose. Furthermore, the association of
pure practical reason and universalism with homogenization
is too hasty. For, it should also be recalled that the first
Critique explains that reason possesses a twofold self-con-
flicting transcendental interest, only one side of which, the
principle of genera, aims at unity and homogeneity. But,
this is "balanced by another principle . . . which calls
for
manifoldness and diversity in things, which Kant calls
the law of specification. The latter "imposes a
check upon
this tendency towards unity, just as the law of genera
checks diversification which verges on chaos. With
such a
twofold interest present in pure reason, both must
also be
inscribed in practical reason.
The practical interest in diversification is much
more
evidenced in Kant's writings than some stereotyping
would
have it. For example, with the focus on a set
of universal
prohibitions which the Categorical Imperative
purportedly
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entails, it is easy to overlook that his fundamental prin-
ciple also entails the permissibility of sets of actions,
namely, ones the maxims of which are universalizable . Per-
missibility does not require the universalization of maxims,
merely their universalizability. Hence, the subjective char-
acter of a maxim is preserved by permissibility, as is what-
ever degree of diversification it might impart to the con-
sequent action. Yet, if reason's interest in specification
is only faintly expressed in that deontic category, it
seems
of much greater significance to Kant elsewhere.
For, as he
argues, "a rational being . . . necessarily wills that
all
his powers should be developed, rather than
letting his
talents rust. That pure practical reason requires
this kind
of individualistic cultivation, is easy to
understand when
its interest in diversification is kept in mind.
Such an in-
terest will assert itself in the judgement that a
maxim which
is too conformistic will be un-universalizable ,
because of
the over-homogenization which universalization
would produce.
Similarly, where conformism stifles the
particular powers of
individual rational agents, reason will
oppose homogeniza-
tion. so, even if Kant is not nearly
as concerned about the
dangers of conformism as is Nietzsche,
this concern is in
scribed in the Categorical Imperative,
and Kant at least oc-
casionally lends his voice to it. In
addition, this concept
of self-development as countering
stagnation, clearly anti-
cipates Nietssche's concept of
self-overcoming.
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In terms of such a practical law of specification, auto-
nomy represents a culmination of this rational interest.
Even when a rational agent legislates in the name of homo-
geneity, it is still the law-giver which is the ground of
the law, and the individual is ascendant over the universal.
Autonomy, not universal harmony or happiness, is the supreme
principle of rational ethics according to Kant. Furthermore,
it is obvious that if autonomy is understood as a stage of
diversification, then the Nietzschean attack on impersonalism
does not apply to it. Instead, what among other things the
attack does apply to is the contention that Kant's moral law
is actually a formula for selflessness. In other words, .
here, as is the case elsewhere, Nietzsche's primary target is
Schopenhauer, whose denigration of the principle of individu-
ation is well-documented, and, by implication, what he per-
ceives as Kant's Schopenhauerian tendencies. Nor is it ac-
curate to understand the attack on impersonalism to be in the
name of personalism. Rather, all three agree that the 'per-
sonal' is transcended in ethics. As has already been dis-
cussed, while Kant maintains that the ethical realm is plu-
ralistic, Schopenhauer argues that transcending the personal
implies transcending the plurality of persons, which is why
ethics is impersonal. Nietzsche can be better understood in
this context to be advocating a superpersonalism, in which
the personal is transcended, but individuation is preserved,
if not enhanced. Thus, Nietzsche's attack on impersonalism
could be construed as a defense of what in at least some
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passages seems to count as one of the fundamental features
of Kant's ethics.
Nietzsche's advocacy of autonomy implies an even higher
level of distinction than autonomy for reason, which he ex-
plains elsewhere. Remarking about Schopenhauer's develop-
ment, he says, "And this is how Schopenhauer's philosophy
should always be interpreted at first: individually, by the
individual only for himself, ... at first only for your-
self, to be sure; but through yourself in the end for every-
one."^ This conception of the social function of the philo-
sooher is later more fully spelled out: "Genuine philoso-
phers, however, are commanders and legislators .... They
first determine the Whither and For What of man .... With
a creative hand they reach for the future, . . . their cre-
ating is a legislation."^^ Thus, Nietzsche's advocacy of
autonomy is an example of this latter kind of legislation,
creating, and commanding. But that means that what he is do-
ing is legislating self-legislation, i.e. the object of his
legislation to others is their own self-legislation. Here he
reaches pure practical reason in its most fundamental form.
Kant originally defines reason as the "faculty of prin-
ciples,"^^ so pure practical reason is the faculty of prac-
tical principles, i.e. of legislation, because a principle is
a law. The operation of pure practical reason is thus essen-
tial to Nietzsche's concept of the ideal philosopher, which
is a main reason why it is a mistake to characterize him as a
misologist.
150
Now, Nietzsche sometimes leaves little doubt that he be-
lieves that Kant does not measure up to that ideal. For, to
legislate is to "create values, whereas Kant merely de-
fends already existing conventional values. But, once again,
Kant is only partially represented in that judgement, as is
Nietzsche. Nietzsche's fundamental position on values is
that "valuating is itself the value and jewel of all valued
things." So, if to evaluate is to legislate, and to legis-
late is to exercise pure practical reason, he is not quib-
bling when Kant asserts that "rational nature exists as an
end in itself,"^' or that the fundamental law of pure prac-
tical reason "is that which first defines the concept of the
good."^^ Nor does it follow that Kant fails to measure up
merely on the grounds that subsequent values which he creates
happen to differ from those which Nietzsche creates. It is
rather when Kant subordinates reason to pre-existing values
that he diminishes in stature to Nietzsche, as, for example,
he arguably does when evaluating happiness in his highest
good. However, as the present dicussion is trying to point
out, the closer Kant stays to fundamental rational prin-
ciples, the greater his affinity to Nietzsche's way of think-
ing, as Nietzsche himself is willing to grant on occasion,
and, more frequently, to imply.
It follows that Schutte's and Lukacs' assessments of
Nietzsche's view of Kant may be at most only partially accu-
rate. Insofar as Kantian reason is naturalistic and careful
to avoid hypostasizing duality, Kant stands outside the
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tradition which Schutte has Nietzsche attaching him to. Giv-
en Kant's committment to the concept of autonomy, and his re-
cognition of the rationality of diversification, he may he as
much an 'egoist' as Lukacs believes Nietzsche is. And, if by
'reason' Lukacs means 'dialectical reason', both may be ' ir-
rationalists' . Therefore, it does not follow from Lukacs'
classification of Nietzsche that the latter is opposed to
Kant. As for Deleuze, he exposes his own shortcomings. De-
spite opposing Nietzschean 'thought' to Kantian 'reason', he
fails to avoid letting on that one of the most distinctive
things about eternal recurrence, the pre-eminent Nietzschean
'thought', is that it fulfills "the requirements of a truly
sufficient reason. If nothing else, this latter reference
to reason raises serious questions about the opposition which
he is trying to establish, therby considerably weakening his
apparent dissent to what has been proposed in these pages.
Conclusion
As Nietzsche points out, Kantian philosophy can be regard-
ed as exhibiting three different facets. The first of these
is the rigorously formal, critical strain of his thought, the
second expresses a concession to conventional interests, and
the third is the popular but shallow interpretation of his
philosophy. For the last Nietzsche stridently expresses con-
tempt, while for the second he holds thoughtful disapproba-
tion, like that which, as I have been contending, holds for
Kant's highest good. But critique is groundless without
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concomitant affirmation. Nietzschean thinking affirms the
q-uestionability of conventional morality, the life-enhancing
potential of the ethical instinct, the positive value of au-
tonomy, and the implication of legislation in the creation of
values. All these are entailed by the principles of pure
practical reason. Hence, a betrayal of pure practical reason
is a fit target for a Nietzschean critique.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The Nietzschean critique of Kant's highest good which has
been advanced seems, in one respect, to be less satisfactory
than the other criticisms of it which have been discussed.
Like the Nietzschean, both the utilitarian and Schopenhauer's
recognize the inadequacy of Kant's treatment of the concept
of happiness, and both suggest a remedy afforded by a superi-
or concept. The superior utilitarian concept is general hap-
piness, while for Schopenhauer it is the happiness of others.
In contrast, aside from some sketchy recommendations to Kant,
the Nietzschean criticism is merely a negative one, namely,
the observation that Kant fails to present an evaluation of
happiness from the perspective of pure practical reason,
without a follow-through new ranking of happiness in a table
of values. But perhaps such negativity is instructive. Per-
haps the concept of personal happiness is so variable, so
contingent on specific circumstances, that no estimate of it
as a general concept is possible. Whether or not Nietzsche
agrees with such speculation depends on a more detailed ex-
amination of his views on the matter.
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